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ABSTRACT 
The Customer is King: Mutual Fund Relationships and Analyst Recommendations 
 
by 
LIU Ping 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
I investigate whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms 
influence sell-side analyst coverage and recommendations. Using a comprehensive 
sample of analyst recommendations in China over the 2004-2008 period, I find that 
the likelihood of analyst coverage and analysts’ relative recommendations, 
benchmarked against consensus recommendations, are positively associated with the 
mutual fund business relationship. I measure the business relation by the weight of a 
stock in the mutual fund client’s portfolio and the commission revenue generated 
from the mutual fund clients. My results show that mutual funds take advantage of 
these optimistic recommendations by selling the stocks. I also find evidence that 
analysts employed in politically connected brokerage firms inflate their 
recommendations on state-controlled listed enterprises. Lastly, I examine the 
short-term and long-term investment returns from a strategy that follows the analyst 
recommendations. In the short-term, I find positive stock returns, which benefit the 
client mutual funds. However, I also find evidence that investors recognize the 
conflict of interest and caps the stock price increases. In the longer-term, the strong 
buy and buy recommendations yield zero or negative stock returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
DECLARATION 
 
 
I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, 
and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have 
been duly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
(LIU Ping) 
Oct 11, 2009 
 
 
 
  
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL OF THESIS 
 
 
THE CUSTOMER IS KING: MUTUAL FUND RELATIONSHIPS AND ANALYST 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
by 
 
LIU Ping 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
Panel of Examiners: 
 
(Chairman) 
Dr. Winnie Pui-han POON 
 
(External Member) 
       Prof. Paul B. MCGUINNESS 
 
(Internal Member) 
 Prof. Michael A. FIRTH 
 
(Internal Member) 
Dr. Karen Yuanyuan ZHANG 
 
 
Chief Supervisor: Prof. Michael A. FIRTH 
 
 
 
Approved for the Senate: 
 
 
                  Prof. Jesús Seade  
                 Chairman, Research and Postgraduate Studies Committee 
 
 
                  Date
 i  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTERS 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 1 
Chapter 2. Literature Review ................................................................................... 5 
2.1 The source of conflicts of interest inherent in analyst report ............................... 5 
2.2 The moderating forces of conflicts of interests .................................................. 10 
2.3 The impacts of conflicts of interests on customers of analyst reports ................. 12 
2.4 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 14 
Chapter 3. The development of China’s mutual funds and brokerage firms ............. 16 
Chapter 4. Empirical Analysis on Mutual Fund Relationships and Analyst 
Recommendations .................................................................................................. 19 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 19 
4.2 Sample and data ............................................................................................... 19 
4.2.1 Measures of analyst optimism ........................................................... 20 
4.2.2 Mutual fund clients’ pressure ............................................................ 21 
4.2.3 Political pressure .............................................................................. 23 
4.2.4 Investment banking pressure ............................................................. 23 
4.2.5 Company characteristics................................................................... 24 
4.2.6 Brokerage firm characteristics .......................................................... 25 
4.2.7 Analyst characteristics ...................................................................... 26 
4.2.8 Other controls ................................................................................... 27 
4.2.9 Company and analyst summary statistics .......................................... 28 
4.3 Mutual fund pressure and political pressure on analyst recommendations ........ 29 
4.3.1 Univariate analysis ........................................................................... 29 
4.3.2 Multivariate analysis ........................................................................ 30 
4.4 Endogenous coverage selection ........................................................................ 33 
4.5 The composition of mutual fund clients ............................................................. 36 
4.6 Mutual fund reactions to the recommendations ................................................. 37 
4.7 Bull and Bear market analysis on analyst optimism .......................................... 38 
4.8 Stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism ............................................... 39 
4.8.1 Short-term stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism............... 39 
4.8.2 Long-term stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism ............... 40 
Chapter 5. Conclusions .......................................................................................... 42 
 
 ii  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 Mutual Fund Industry and Brokerage Firms in China………………….......45 
Table 2 Definitions of Variables…………………………………………………… 46 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Analyst-Stock Observations..……..…………........47 
Table 4 Summary Statistics………………………………..………………………...49 
Table 5 Firm Characteristics and Analyst Characteristics for Stocks Receiving 
Investment Ratings……………………………………………………......................50 
Table 6 Univariate Analysis on Analyst Ratings and Institutional and Political 
Pressure…………………………………...................................................................51 
Table 7 Mutual fund client and political pressure on analysts’ relative 
recommendations……………………………………………………….…...............52 
Table 8 Endogenous coverage selection……………………….…….………….......54 
Table 9 The Composition of Mutual Fund Clients and Analysts’ Relative 
Recommendation………………………………………………………...……….....56 
Table 10 Change in the portfolio weight of a covered stock and analyst 
optimism…….……………………………………………………………... ...... …..57 
Table 11 Bull and Bear market analysis on analyst behavior…...……………..…....58 
Table 12 Investment returns from following analyst recommendations….………....59 
 iii  
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
I am especially grateful to my Chief-Supervisor, Prof. Michael Firth and Dr. Chen 
Lin, for their thorough guidance on my thesis. I also appreciate the financial support 
provided by Lingnan University and City University of Hong Kong, which makes it 
possible for me to complete my studies. Furthermore, I wish to extend my 
appreciation to Joel Houston, Paul Malatesta, Paul McGuinness (external examiner), 
Winnie Poon (chair of the exam board), Sonia Wong, Yuhai Xuan, Karen Zhang, Joe 
Zou and seminar participants at two Lingnan University workshops for helpful 
comments on the thesis, and Vanessa Chan, Xue Han, Clara Hui and Miranda Lee for 
their kind help during my studies. Finally, I want to thank my family for their love 
and encouragement. 
 1  
The Customer is King: Mutual Fund Relationships and Analyst 
Recommendations 
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Recent events call into question the integrity of the sell-side equity research 
industry. Stock analysts are accused of being partly responsible for the dot-com 
bubble and the more recent failure to detect the accounting fraud at Enron and other 
companies. Failure to predict the financial crisis that currently engulfs the world’s 
economies and analysts’ positive recommendations on banking stocks that 
subsequently crashed have further eroded confidence in the profession1
Ideally, an analyst’s role is to search for economic and firm-specific information, 
to critically evaluate and interpret this information, and to write research reports and 
make investment recommendations that are useful to investors. The analyst should be 
objective and exercise independent judgment. However, recent research has 
identified a number of conflicts of interest that impede an analyst’s function as an 
objective financial intermediary. For example, stock analysts are under pressure to 
produce optimistic forecasts to maintain good relationships with listed company 
management (Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan, 1998; Lim, 2001). Absent a good 
relationship, an analyst will be unable to question management about a firm’s 
operations, policies, and prospects. As another example, trading departments may 
compel their in-house analysts to generate optimistic reports in order to boost trading 
commissions from investors (Irvine, 2001, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Cowen, Groysberg 
and Healy, 2006; Agrawal and Chen, 2008). Investors are more likely to trade if there 
. One popular 
explanation for the poor performance of investment analysts is that they sacrifice 
their objectivity by publicly touting stocks of their employers’ clients (or potential 
clients), in exchange for lucrative business deals from those clients.  
                                                        
1 For details, please refer to Reingold, D., Reingold, J., 2006. Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst. 
HarperCollins, New York. 
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is a buy recommendation. Although sell recommendations can be valuable, many 
investors may be prevented, legally, operationally, or psychologically, from short 
selling and so the trading commissions earned from sell recommendations will be 
lower than for buy recommendations. As a third example, investment bankers may 
pressure their research departments to issue favorable reports on the stocks of their 
current or prospective clients in order to win lucrative underwriting business (Lin 
and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; O’Brien, McNichols and Lin, 
2005; Ljungvist, Marston, Starks, Wei and Yan, 2007) and make capital raising (e.g., 
IPOs, SEOs, debt-issues) more successful. Recently, Mola and Guidolin (2009) 
identify another source of conflict that can arise in financial services firms that house 
mutual fund operations as well as brokerage units. They find that brokerage analysts 
in the U.S. upgrade their recommendations on stocks owned by mutual funds that are 
part of the same full-service financial group (these are termed affiliated mutual 
funds). Mola and Guidolin argue that the analysts are under pressure to recommend 
these stocks to improve the affiliated mutual fund performance. These conflicts of 
interest have been the subject of criminal and civil lawsuits and have resulted in new 
laws and regulations. Most of the relevant literature, as well as the litigation, come 
from the U.S. although other countries are not immune to these problems. 
I analyze the conflicts of interest that pertain to pressures that are placed on 
analysts to inflate (or, occasionally, deflate) their recommendations on a stock using 
Chinese data. This thesis is comprised of one main chapter (Chapter 4), two 
background chapters (Chapters 2 and 3), and an introductory chapter (this chapter) 
and a concluding chapter (Chapter 5). In Chapter 2, I offer a succinct yet thorough 
literature review on conflicts of interests in the sell-side equity research industry. In 
particular, I review the major studies on the incentives of analysts to bias their 
reports, the forces that moderate analyst bias, and the impact of such conflicts of 
interests on customers of analyst reports. I trace the development of mutual funds 
and brokerages in modern-day China in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 4, I investigate whether the business relations between mutual funds 
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and brokerage firms influence sell-side analyst coverage and recommendations using 
a comprehensive sample of analyst recommendations in China over the 2004-2008 
period. This chapter forms the main basis of my thesis. I find that a broker makes 
positively biased investment recommendations on those stocks already held by its 
mutual fund clients in order to help bolster the performance of the clients’ portfolios 
and thus earn more business from them. Thus, I turn the normal presumption of an 
analyst’s recommendation informing mutual funds’ investment decisions on its head. 
A simple business relationship with mutual funds may create a conflict of interest for 
the analyst. My study therefore contributes to the extant literature on the 
independence of sell-side analysts by identifying another major source of conflict 
facing stock analysts. 
An important contribution of my study is that I use data from China, a country 
where relatively little is known about the financial services industry despite its rapid 
development in recent years. The focus on China allows us to examine the influence 
of the state on analysts’ recommendations. A major feature of China’s financial 
system is the dominant government ownership of listed firms (Chen, Firth, Xin and 
Xu, 2008). Analysts may be under pressure to make favorable investment 
recommendations on state controlled listed firms and I expect this influence will be 
stronger in politically connected brokerages. 2
    I organize the remainder of the thesis as follows. Chapter 2 offers a thorough 
literature review on conflicts of interests in the sell-side equity research industry. I 
discuss the development of the mutual fund industry and brokerage firms in Chapter 
3. Chapter 4 describes the core empirical results on mutual fund relationships and 
 By examining whether analysts’ 
recommendations are biased when the listed company is controlled by the state and 
when there are political connections between the state and the brokerage, my study 
contributes to the small but growing literature on political connection biases in 
finance (e.g. Khwaja and Mian, 2005a; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006; 
Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008). 
                                                        
2 Following Firth, Lin, Liu and Wong. (2009b), I define a brokerage firm to be politically connected if the 
brokerage firm’s CEO was a government official before he/she takes the position in the brokerage firm. 
 4  
analyst recommendations. Chapter 5 concludes.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction can potentially gain 
from taking actions that are detrimental to its counterparty. In the context of a 
sell-side equity analyst3
    For academia, recent attention paid to conflicts of interests in the equity 
research industry examines the following three broad aspects. What are the sources 
of conflicts of interests in equity research industry? Are the mechanisms that control 
the conflicts of interests in market economies also effective in equity research 
industry? Do conflicts of interests have adverse impacts on customers of analyst 
reports? In this chapter, I review the recent literature and explain how the extant 
papers contribute to each of the aforementioned three aspects. There are a large and 
growing number of papers examining each of the three broad questions. Therefore, 
my review is selective and should be viewed as such. Most of the studies reviewed in 
this chapter use data from the United States. This may limit the generalizability of 
the results although the non-U.S. research often reaches the same conclusions. 
, a conflict of interest arises if the analyst’s employer---- the 
financial institution--- obtains a direct advantage, such as underwriting business or an 
increase in trading commission, by providing biased analyst reports on a company to 
its customers.       
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 identifies the sources of conflicts 
of interests inherent in analyst reports. I turn to the moderating forces of the conflicts 
of interests in the equity research industry in Section 2. Section 3 examines the 
impact of such conflicts of interests on the customers of analyst reports. Section 4 
concludes. 
2.1 The source of conflicts of interest inherent in analyst report 
In many cases, financial institutions have better information than buyers over 
                                                        
3 Sell-side analysts are those who work for brokerage firms. Buy-side analysts are those who work for 
institutional investors. In this chapter, I focus exclusively on the former type of analysts. In this thesis, “analyst” 
denotes a sell-side analyst unless otherwise stated.  
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which products best serves buyers’ needs (Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2007). Such 
information asymmetries open the door to conflicts of interests. Bolton, Freixas and 
Shapiro analyze the situations under which the customers have difficulties 
ascertaining the quality of the service provided by financial institutions. Under such 
conditions, the financial institutions might provide tainted advice, for example, 
biased analyst recommendations, to customers.     
    However, the analyst reports do not completely fit into Bolton et al.’s 
framework. Historically, the primary customers of analyst reports are institutional 
investors. The institutional investors do not directly pay for the analyst services of 
brokerage firms but do so indirectly through trading commissions directed to the 
brokerage firms. They receive analyst reports from several brokerage firms on a 
regular basis since most of the institutional investors allocate their trading 
commissions among different brokers. Many institutional investors have their own 
research departments and rely on analyst reports from brokerage firms to provide 
different viewpoints than they get from their own analysts. Beginning in the 1990s, 
analyst reports have become more available to retail investors as individuals’ 
portfolios increase in value and as they become important customers to the brokers. 
In contrast to institutional investors, retail investors lack cost-effective ways to 
evaluate the quality of analyst services and to examine the past performance of 
analyst forecasts. Moreover, retail investors focus mainly on the target price or 
investment recommendations featured in analysts’ reports and do not have the time or 
expertise to evaluate the detailed information. These neglected details might contain 
information related to conflicts of interests. Based on published information 
(litigation cases4
    The deregulation and diversification of financial institutions creates a fertile 
, newspaper investigations, journal articles), conflicts of interests in 
the equity research industry have been escalating since the 1990s.   
                                                        
4 For example, in November 2003, Morgan Stanley paid a $50 million civil penalty as a result of an agreement 
with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) to settle charges of conflicts of interest in selling in-house 
funds to investors. According to the charges, Morgan Stanley had improperly provided its brokers with incentives 
to sell Morgan Stanley funds over those run by outside fund companies. These incentives included the widespread  
use of contests among brokers to promote Morgan Stanley funds. See Solomon and Lauricella, 2003. Morgan 
Stanley to settle with SEC. Wall Street Journal November 17, C9. 
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ground for conflicts of interests that might not create value for shareholders. 
Literatures on corporate diversification suggest that the market value of a 
conglomerate is lower than that of a portfolio of comparable specialized firms, which 
is called diversification discount (Lang and Stulz, 1994). Similar findings also hold 
in the finance industry (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007). So far, many of the identified 
sources of conflicts of interests in the equity research industry stem from the 
diversification of financial institutions where there is intense pressure to cross-sell 
products and services and to maximize total revenues.   
    One popular explanation for analyst upward bias is that analysts working for 
investment banks were compromised by the hefty bonuses they could earn from 
writing favorable reports on their employers’ investment banking clients and 
potential investment banking clients. Here, the analysts are pressured by their 
investment banking departments to issue optimistic reports. Dugar and Nathan (1995) 
find that analysts from brokerage firms that provide investment banking services to a 
company (investment banker analysts) are more optimistic on that company 
compared to other analysts. In their study, they identify a sample of firms and their 
investment bankers. They match each analyst report from the investment bank with a 
report produced by an independent analyst. They find that analysts are more 
optimistic on their employers’ investment banking clients as regards earnings 
forecasts and recommendations. Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei and Yan (2007) 
examine analyst optimism while controlling for their issuance history. They also find 
that analysts issued more optimistic than market consensus reports when they are 
affiliated with investment banks that have existing business ties with the firm 
covered. In contrast, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) fail to find significant associations 
between existing investment banking relationships and analysts’ responsiveness to 
bad news once they control for the institutional ownership of the stocks. 
    Several papers examine analyst behavior following equity offerings and reach 
similar findings: analysts affiliated to the underwriters are more optimistic compared 
with unaffiliated analysts on the equity offerings. McNichols and Lin (1998) examine 
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analyst reports on firms with seasoned equity offerings and find that analysts 
affiliated to lead underwriters are more optimistic on recommendations and growth 
forecasts, but not on one-year and two-year ahead earnings forecasts. Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan (2000) reach similar findings using a sample of 1,179 equity 
offerings. Michaely and Womack (1999) examine 391 IPOs and find that stocks 
receiving buy recommendations from an investment banker’s analysts perform 
poorly. O’Brien, McNichols and Lin (2005) find that affiliated analysts downgrade 
their buy recommendations more slowly than unaffiliated analysts subsequent to 
equity offerings. In contrast, Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2006) examine the IPOs in 
1999 and 2000 and find no evidence for a different reaction between affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts’ initiation of coverage once they control for recommendation 
characteristics and timing even though affiliated analysts are more optimistic. James 
and Karceski (2006) find that IPO firms with poor aftermarket performance are given 
higher target-prices and strong buy recommendations by affiliated analysts.  
    Although many studies identify investment banking pressure as a potential 
source of conflicts of interests in equity research industry, empirical support is mixed.  
Firstly, though it is often taken for granted that investment bankers pressure their 
analysts when they can, there is no direct evidence that investment bankers can 
benefit from upward biased in-house analyst reports. For example, Ljungqvist, 
Martson and Wilhelm (2006) investigate whether analyst behavior influences banks’ 
likelihood of winning underwriting mandates for debt and equity offerings in 
1993-2002 and find no evidence that aggressive analyst behavior helps banks win 
underwriting mandates. According to them, the main determinants of the lead-bank 
choice are the strength of prior underwriting and lending relationships. Similarly, 
Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau (2007) find no evidence that optimistic earnings 
forecasts or recommendations affects investment banking order flow. What is more, 
analyst optimism could stem from selection bias or some unknown underlying 
factors. For example, Bajari and Krainer (2004) find that when controlling for the 
selection bias, conflicts of interests due to investment banking do not have a 
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significant impact on analyst optimism on firms in the NASDAQ 100 from 1998 to 
2003. Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006) find that corporate net external 
financing determines analyst optimism. The analysts are more optimistic on firms 
with more equity issuance and less optimistic on firms with more equity repurchases. 
However, they find that the investment banking relations between analysts’ 
employers and covered firms are not significant determinants of analyst optimism. 
Less optimistic earnings forecasts do not necessarily mean that conflicts of interests 
do not exist. Analysts might issue pessimistic reports so that the firms can easily beat 
the analyst forecasts. A positive earnings surprise pushes the stock price upward. 
Such pessimism is prevalent during bull market periods since the market penalizes 
negative earnings surprises severely during hot market periods (Chan, Karceski and 
Lakonishok, 2006). There is no certainty that an analyst who fails to change a 
recommendation as a stock price falls is providing a misleading or fraudulent 
recommendation (Mehran and Stulz, 2007). The analyst might stick to his/her 
valuation model and hold on to his/her current recommendation rating until the input 
to valuation model changes. In sum, the empirical evidence of the impact of 
investment banking pressure on biased analyst reports is mixed.  
    Another conflict of interest arises from brokerage activity. A brokerage firm 
benefits from more trading. Therefore, the brokerage department will pressure its 
in-house analysts to issue optimistic reports. The rationale is as follows: if investors 
follow analyst recommendations, the buy recommendations and upgrades will 
generate more trades than sell recommendations and downgrades. Since short-selling 
is costly and often restrictive to most investors, the negative analyst opinions only 
generate trades from investors who already hold the stock.    
    Several papers examine whether upward biased analyst reports generate more 
trades. Irvine (2001) uses Toronto Stock Exchange trading data and finds that buy 
recommendations generate more trades. Earnings forecasts bias (forecasts minus 
actual earnings) are not associated with more trades but forecasts relative to market 
consensus are. Similarly, Jackson (2005) also finds that optimistic analysts generate 
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more trades, as do high-reputation analysts, using data from the Australian stock 
market.  
The last form of conflict of interests comes from the pressure of affiliated asset 
management departments. Analysts working for a full-service brokerage firm have 
incentives to research a stock and promote its purchase by recommending it once 
their asset-management department invests in that stock. The analysts do so to 
support the performance of the affiliated fund family. In exchange, the analysts 
receive incentive compensation from their affiliated fund family. In essence, this is a 
type of “front-running” conflict (“front-running” is where the analyst or affiliated 
investor buys before the analyst publishes a “buy” recommendation). Mola and 
Guidolin (2008) analyze a large sample of recommendations issued by analysts 
working for full-service brokerage firms from 1995 to 2006 and find that analysts are 
likely to issue frequent and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts’ affiliated 
mutual funds have invested in that stock. An analyst’s decision to upgrade a stock to 
“strong buy” ratings is significantly related to the portfolio weight of that stock in the 
fund family. 
 
2.2 The moderating forces of conflicts of interests 
Conflicts of interests could be acute but have no material impact on the quality 
of analyst service because of mitigating forces. First of all, an analyst has an 
incentive to protect his/her own reputation. If a stock analyst always issues biased 
reports to help their employers win investment banking deals, investors will 
eventually recognize the bias and ignore the analysts’ future recommendations. As a 
result, the analyst will lose the ability to help his/her employers. Therefore, in the 
repeated interactions between analysts and investors, reputation is very important and 
can discipline an analyst’s opportunistic behavior.  
    Jackson (2005) shows that more accurate analysts have higher reputations. A 
highly reputed analyst is more capable of biasing his/her recommendations to 
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generate more trades. If the reputation is extremely valuable and extremely fragile, 
the analyst will ignore the pressure from the investment banking department and the 
brokerage department. Therefore, conflicts of interests do not have a material impact 
on analyst reports. Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006) also point out that an 
analyst is faced with a tradeoff between preserving private career concerns and 
potential short term economic payoffs associated with biased recommendations. The 
analyst is more likely to taint his/her advice when the potential economic payoff 
associated with the biased reports is large and when the reputation loss is less.  
    Many papers document the benefits of being selected as an All-American 
analyst as well as its disciplinary effect on analyst behavior. An analyst’s ranking in 
the Institutional Investor annual poll is significantly associated with his/her 
compensation and his/her job security (Stickel, 1992). Therefore, the All-American 
analysts are concerned about maintaining their reputation. All-star analysts are 
quicker to downgrade their buy recommendations compared to their unranked peers. 
All-star analysts’ forecasts remain accurate during hot markets while other analysts’ 
do not (Fang and Yasuda, 2006a, 2006b). Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau (2007) also 
find that all-star analysts that switch their employers do not change their optimism in 
earnings forecasts and recommendations although they do revise their coverage 
decisions.            
    Institutional investors may moderate analysts’ conflicts of interests for the 
following two reasons. Firstly, the trading commissions from institutional investors 
are an important source of income of analysts’ employers. The quality of stock 
research is an important factor when institutional investors allocate trading 
commissions among brokers. Moreover, institutional investors determine analyst 
career prospects through voting in the Institutional Investor annual poll. Therefore 
analysts are responsive to the needs of institutional investors. Ljungqvist, Marston, 
Starks, Wei and Yan (2007) find that institutional ownership of stocks determines 
analyst coverage decisions and moderates analyst optimism relative to market 
consensus. Analysts also strive for higher forecast accuracy and downgrade 
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recommendations more quickly to bad news on stocks with higher institutional 
ownership.   
What is more, the labor market also disciplines analyst bias. Research shows 
that more accurate analysts are better rewarded by the labor market. Mikhail, Walther 
and Willis (1999) show that an analyst who is less accurate than his/ her peers is 
more likely to be replaced in spite of the profitability of his/her recommendations. 
Hong and Kubik (2003) find that analysts that are more accurate have higher 
likelihoods to move to prestigious investment banks.  
    Financial institutions themselves have incentives to moderate the conflicts of 
interests faced by their analysts. Even if the buyer is at an information disadvantage 
in a financial transaction, he/she will not be hurt as long as both parties to the 
transaction form their expectations rationally. The buyer will enter into the 
transaction only when the price of the good is favorable enough to cover any losses 
that may arise from potential conflicts of interests. Thus, the seller (financial 
institution) bears the cost of any conflicts of interests and therefore has the incentive 
to reduce the impact of the conflicts of interests to maximize the selling price.  
Jacob, Rock and Weber (2003) find that forecasts of quarterly earnings, annual 
earnings and long-term growth by investment bank analysts are more accurate and 
less optimistic than those from analysts of independent research firms. Clarke, 
Khorana, Patel and Rau (2004) also find that analysts’ at large investment banks 
provide less optimistic and more accurate earnings forecasts, and are more likely to 
provide the first forecast for a firm in any given quarter. Abnormal returns following 
recommendations from these large investment banks are also higher than those 
following the advice of other financial institutions. Analysts do not change their 
optimism when moving to large investment banks. 
 
2.3 The impacts of conflicts of interests on customers of analyst reports 
Even if the aforementioned moderating mechanisms fail to function and analysts 
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decide to issue biased or fraudulent reports, customers are not necessarily hurt by 
those biased reports as long as they form their expectations rationally. The customers 
will discount the quality of those reports to make sure that they are not harmed by the 
potential conflicts of interests.  
There are many empirical studies that examine whether conflicted analyst 
reports are inaccurate, and whether customers realize the conflicts of interests in 
analyst report and discount the credibility of them. Firstly, some papers compare the 
returns from acting on conflicted analysts’ reports versus the returns from acting on 
independent analysts’ reports. For example, Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) find 
that post-offering underperformance is most pronounced for firms with the highest 
growth forecasts made by affiliated analysts. Barber, Lehavy and Truman (2007) find 
that following buy recommendations from independent analysts generate higher 
abnormal returns compared with following buy recommendations from investment 
bank analysts. This difference is more pronounced after the NASDAQ peaked and 
for firms with recent equity offerings. Meanwhile, sell ratings from investment banks 
earn more abnormal stock returns than sell ratings from independent research firms. 
However, other studies fail to find differences in abnormal returns from strategies 
that follow analyst reports from investment banks and those that follow analyst 
reports from other financial institutions (Clarke, Khorana, Patel and Rau, 2004). 
Some other studies concentrate on the market reaction to potentially conflicted 
analyst reports and to independent analyst reports. Lin and McNichols (1998) study a 
sample of stocks with seasoned offerings and find that hold recommendations from 
affiliated analysts are more informative than holds from other analysts. In particular, 
they show that investors treat affiliated analysts’ hold recommendations as sells. 
Agrawal and Chen (2008) also find that the capital market discounts optimistic bias. 
On the other hand, Michaely and Womack (1999) find that investors only partially 
discount the recommendations by affiliated analysts and stock prices do not react as 
much to buy recommendations issued by underwriter analysts (analysts working for 
an underwriting bank) compared to non-underwriter analysts.  
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Evidence of analysts maintaining buy recommendations even after the stock 
prospects appear to deteriorate is often viewed as proof of conflicts of interests in 
analyst reports. For example, O’Brien, McNichols and Lin (2005) find that affiliated 
analysts downgrade their recommendations from a buy rating more slowly than 
independent analysts after equity offerings. However, Ljungqvist et al. (2007) find 
that analysts’ responsiveness to bad news is unrelated to the strength of existing 
investment banking relationships.  
The mixed empirical evidence is due in part to the difficulty in discovering 
conflicts of interests in analyst reports that vary across investor types. Institutional 
investors generally have cheaper ways to monitor the quality of analysts’ services 
than retail investors, and they are more capable of disciplining the dishonest behavior 
of analysts compared with retail investors. Correspondingly, Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar (2007) find that large investors react to strong buy recommendations 
but not to buy recommendations, and they sell on hold recommendations. Small 
investors follow the recommendations literally. Also large investors discount 
recommendations from affiliated analysts while small investors fail to adjust for the 
distorted incentives of analysts. They also find that there is little evidence of 
differences in stock returns from investment strategies that follow recommendations 
from affiliated analysts versus those that follow unaffiliated recommendations.  
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks     
In conclusion, the extant research identifies several sources of conflicts of 
interests facing a typical analyst working for full-service brokerage firm. An analyst 
working for full-service brokerage house is pressured by its investment banking 
department to issue flattering reports on the existing or potential investment banking 
clients; is pressured by brokerage department to issue optimistic reports to boost 
trading volume; and is pressured by his/ her in-house asset management department 
to prop up its performance. However, the reputation concerns of analysts and their 
 15  
employers discipline conflicts of interests. The labor market also plays an important 
role in containing conflicting reports. Large investors are more capable of protecting 
themselves from conflicts of interests in analyst reports than small investors. 
However, the mixed empirical evidence on the existence of conflicts of interests and 
their impacts on their clients suggest that there might be other underlying factors or 
influences facing a typical equity analyst. For example, institutional investors play a 
role in shaping analyst upward biased reports, as the trading commission from them 
is a source of stable income. Institutional investors’ opinions and votes in the 
Institutional Investor annual poll is a clear metric of analyst performance and thus 
helps determine analyst career prospects.  
Most of the published research to date relies on U.S. data and institutions. The 
purpose of my research is to extend this line of enquiry to China, a country with a 
fast developing financial infrastructure. In particular, my thesis empirically examines 
the impact of mutual fund clients’ shareholdings on analyst’s upward bias.  My 
study contributes to the literature on conflicts of interests in financial industry by 
discovering another important source of conflict of interest that is omnipresent in the 
equity research industry. 
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Chapter 3. The development of China’s mutual funds and brokerage firms 
In order to help stabilize the stock markets and strengthen corporate governance 
the government made a strategic decision in year 2000 to develop securities mutual 
funds as institutional investors in tradable shares (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, 2000).5 Since then, the mutual fund industry has grown dramatically. 
In 2002 and 2004, the National Council for Social Security Fund designated six and 
four mutual fund families, respectively, to manage the national security fund. This 
policy further boosts the mutual fund industry. As shown in Table1A, the number of 
mutual funds increased from 34 in 2000 to 368 in 2007. These funds are managed by 
60 mutual fund families (named Fund Management Companies in China). The 
aggregate net asset value has grown from 84.56 billion RMB in 2000 to 3275.40 
billion RMB seven years later. A few large fund families dominate China’s mutual 
fund industry. As shown in Table1A, the total assets under management of the five 
largest mutual fund families in 2007 accounts for about 32% of total tradable shares 
held by the entire mutual fund industry6
The mutual fund industry in China draws its inspiration from, and is organized 
along the lines of, mutual funds in the U.S. and other developed countries. They 
make their money from differences between the buying and selling prices of the fund 
units as well as from a management fee based on the total value of the fund. The 
mutual fund families advertise extensively for new unit holders and emphasize the 
performance of their funds. Competition is very fierce and so mutual fund managers 
are under pressure to improve investment returns. Many fund houses have their own 
research departments that search for undervalued securities. Thus, mutual funds are 
not entirely dependent on brokerage analysts for investment advice. 
.  
                                                        
5 The rules governing mutual funds are codified in the Securities Investment Fund Law of 2003. 
6 China’s stocks are divided into tradable shares and non-tradable shares. While the former can be held by all 
investors and can be traded freely on the stock exchanges, the latter are exclusively held by the government and 
its designated agencies and generally cannot be traded on the stock exchanges. In 2005/6, a share reform program 
was implemented where all shares are to be made tradable after a lock up period expires (Firth, Lin and Zou, 
2009a). The lock up period ends in 2008 or 2009. 
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[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1B presents a summary of the revenues and income of China’s brokerage 
firms from 2002 to 2007. Prior to 2006, most brokerage firms in China suffered 
losses because of the poor performances of their proprietary investments in the stock 
market. In year 2005 there was a major reorganization of China’s brokerage firm 
industry, which included a merger and acquisition wave among existing firms, 
bankruptcies of some financially unviable firms, and the entry of some new firms. In 
2007, the brokerage firms reported significant earnings that exceeded 141 billion 
RMB. There are 66 full-service brokerage firms which offer both underwriting and 
brokerage services (they are the counterparts of investment banks in U.S.).  
A major feature of China’s brokerage industry is the substantial proportion of 
trading commissions in a brokerage firm’s total revenue. During 2002 to 2007, the 
annual trading commission accounts for more than 51% of brokerage firms’ total 
annual revenue, while the security underwriting fees contribute, on average, less than 
5% of total revenue. Commissions paid by institutional investors are a relatively 
constant source of income compared to the commissions from retail investors, which 
are highly volatile in China7
Many brokerages employ investment analysts to carry out research on stocks 
and make recommendations on what to buy and, occasionally, what to sell. The 
analysts’ reports are sent to existing and potential institutional clients as well as to 
individual investors. Summary recommendations are often disclosed on web-sites 
and in financial newsletters and newspapers. Analysts’ recommendations are 
therefore widely circulated and are effectively in the public domain. Thus, they can 
influence the investment decisions of many investors. 
.  
Periodically, mutual fund families poll their fund managers to help them decide 
how to allocate trading commissions among brokerage firms.  This leads to 
allocations being based, in part, on which sell-side analyst provides more 
“supportive” research (i.e., that supports the mutual funds’ existing stock holdings). 
                                                        
7 The analysis in this section comes from an article by Xin Jiang in the China Security Journal entitled “Fierce 
competition for commission from the mutual fund industry”, September 6, 2008 (in Chinese).  
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Because commissions are so important to the brokerage firm, and hence an analyst’s 
compensation, the analysts have strong economic incentives to make buy or strong 
buy recommendations on the stocks that are held by mutual fund clients and to resist 
making negative recommendations. An analyst’s optimism on a specific stock will be 
positively related to the weight that stock has in the mutual funds’ portfolios. Analyst 
optimism increases as the trading commissions paid by their mutual fund clients 
increases.     
Many listed firms in China are controlled or owned by the government. The 
analysts might succumb to political pressure to bias positively their recommendations 
on the state owned listed firms. This effect is likely to be stronger for analysts 
employed by politically connected brokerage firms, where the CEOs of brokerage 
firms are former government officials. The politically connected managers in these 
brokerage firms will try to curry favor with the bureaucrats to gain political credits 
and maximize their political career prospects (Firth et al., 2009a). I empirically test 
this conjecture in my analysis. 
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Chapter 4. Empirical Analysis on Mutual Fund Relationships and Analyst 
Recommendations 
4.1 Introduction 
In a recent paper, Mola and Guidolin (2009) identify a source of conflict that 
can arise in financial services firms that house mutual fund operations as well as 
brokerage units. They find that brokerage analysts in the U.S. upgrade their 
recommendations on stocks owned by mutual funds that are part of the same 
full-service financial group (these are termed affiliated mutual funds). Mola and 
Guidolin argue that the analysts are under pressure to recommend these stocks to 
improve the affiliated mutual fund performance.  
This study extends the research of Mola and Guidolin to cases where 
brokerages and mutual funds do not have a common ownership. In particular, I 
examine how the business relations between a brokerage and an independently 
owned mutual fund might impact on analysts’ investment recommendations. I argue 
that a broker has incentives to issue positively biased investment recommendations 
on those stocks already held by its mutual fund clients in order to prop up (or not to 
hurt) the performance of these institutional clients and thus earn more business 
(mainly in terms of trading commission) from them.  
I organize the remainder of the Chapter as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
sample and data used in this study. Section 4.3 to Section 4.8 discusses the empirical 
results.   
4.2 Sample and data 
The data used in this study are mainly from two large databases: the I/B/E/S 
database of research analyst recommendations and the WIND Financial Database. 
The sample period is from the first quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2008. 
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WIND is the leading integrated financial service platform of market quotes and 
financial data in China. It is widely used by academics and the finance industry. I 
focus on 2004-2008 for the following two reasons: firstly, WIND begins tracking 
analyst recommendations from 2004. Secondly, this period includes China’s 
record-breaking bull market period (from June 6th, 2005 to October 16th, 2007) as 
well as the subsequent drastic stock market correction. The sample period allows me 
to examine the analyst behavior in two distinct market conditions, a bull market and 
a bear market. Table 2 presents definitions of the variables used in this study.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
4.2.1 Measures of analyst optimism 
I obtain international investment banks’ (e.g., Goldman Sachs, UBS) research 
analyst recommendations on China’s stocks (both A share and B share8) from I/B/E/S. 
Analyst recommendations from domestic brokerage firms (such as CITIC Security 
Co. Ltd) are extracted from the WIND Financial Database. WIND records analyst 
recommendations in an identical way to I/B/E/S9
I use a relative recommendation to measure an analyst’s optimism. Here, I 
follow Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and take the individual investment recommendation 
featured in an analyst’s report (strong buy, buy, hold, under perform and sell) and 
subtract the market consensus (the mean investment ratings of all the analysts 
covering the same stock in the same quarter). Table 3A presents the summary 
statistics across years. My sample consists of 18,790 analyst recommendations issued 
. Each recommendation enters into 
WIND in real-time sequence with standardized five digit ratings identical to I/B/E/S. 
I reverse the rating codes in this study, so that 1 denotes a “sell” rating while 5 
denotes a “strong buy”.     
                                                        
8 The stocks listed in China are categorized into A shares and B shares. A shares are traded in RMB and the A 
share market is open to all domestic investors and qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII). B shares are 
traded in either U.S. dollars or Hong Kong dollars and the B share market was initially exclusive to foreign 
investors. Although China recently opened its B share market to domestic investors, there is relatively little 
trading as the investors do not have access to foreign currencies (U.S. and Hong Kong dollars). 
9 WIND also has earnings forecast data but the coverage is quite limited. I therefore limit myself to analyses of 
investment recommendations. Previous studies document the advantage of using relative investment ratings 
rather than earnings forecasts to measure analysts’ optimism (Ljungqvist et al., 2007). 
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by 1,613 analysts from 59 full-service brokerage firms on 1,354 stocks listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 to the first half of 2008. As 
shown in Table 3A, the “strong buy” and “buy” recommendations are much more 
common than the other three investment ratings during my sample period. More than 
70% of recommendations are rated as “strong buy” or “buy”, while “under perform” 
and “sell” ratings account for only about 4% percent of the sample recommendations. 
The large growth in mutual funds and the prohibition of short selling in China may 
contribute to the preponderance of buy recommendations. Analysts also tend to make 
favorable investment recommendations in the U.S. (e.g., Mola and Guidolin, 2009).  
Both the number of “buy” and “strong buy” recommendations and the market 
consensus recommendation have increased throughout the sample years, indicating 
that analyst optimism has grown regardless of market condition. As indicated in 
Table 3B, my sample includes a majority (87.22% and 80.60%, respectively) of the A 
shares listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Analysts tend to 
neglect most of the B shares because of the relatively small investor pool and low 
turnover rate in the B share market. Stocks in the manufacturing and mining industry 
receive disproportionately more analyst coverage, followed by stocks in the financial 
and property sectors. Specifically, recommendations on manufacturing and mining 
stocks and on finance and property stocks account for 60% and 11%, respectively, of 
total observations. Such preferences toward specific industries suggest that analysts 
are strategic in choosing which stocks to cover (for similar evidence in the U.S., see 
McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Ljungvist et al., 2007). As indicated in Table 3B, 
27.13% of recommendations in my sample are of state-owned shares covered by 
politically connected analysts. 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
4.2.2 Mutual fund clients’ pressure 
WIND has an institutional shareholding database and a database covering 
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details on commission payments made by each mutual fund to individual brokerage 
firms, constructed from the mutual funds’ quarterly reports and half-year reports, 
respectively. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC, hereafter) 
requires each mutual fund to report its stockholdings in its quarterly report. 
According to the CSRC, each mutual fund must disclose details of their trading 
commission payments in its half-year report, including the total amount of stock 
trading commission and the distribution of the commission among brokerage firms.  
I focus my tests on how the business relations between brokerage firms and 
their mutual fund clients have an impact on analyst optimism. A mutual fund is 
regarded as a client of analyst i’s brokerage firm if it reports commission payments to 
i’s brokerage firm in the most recent half-year report. An analyst i from brokerage 
firm b covering stock j is considered to be subject to pressure from b’s mutual fund 
clients if at least one of the mutual fund clients already hold stock j in its portfolio. 
For an analyst i working for brokerage firm b covering stock j in quarter t, I use two 
variables to measure the strength of the impact of broker-mutual fund business 
relation on analyst optimism (relative to market consensus). My first variable, related 
holding, is stock j’s weight in the aggregate portfolio of brokerage firm b’s mutual 
fund clients10
                                                        
10 To construct the variable related holding, firstly I aggregate the market values of stock j held by every mutual 
fund client of brokerage firm b at the end of quarter t-1. This aggregate market value of stock j constructed in the 
first step is then divided by the total net asset value of all of b’s mutual fund clients that held stock j at the end of 
quarter t-1.   
 in quarter t-1. This measures the importance of stock j for the mutual 
fund clients. The variable is lagged one quarter to ensure that the mutual fund clients’ 
investment size in stock j affects recommendations assigned by analyst i, not the 
reverse. My second variable, commission, is the commission payments made by 
mutual fund clients that already hold stock j covered by brokerage firm b as a 
proportion of the total trading commission revenue from the mutual fund industry 
paid to brokerage firm b. This variable is measured on a half-year basis and is lagged 
one half-year to exclude the potential reverse causality problem. This measurement 
captures the economic importance of those mutual fund clients to brokerage firm b. 
As shown in Table 4, the recommendations issued by analysts on stocks already held 
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by their brokerage firms’ mutual fund clients (relation dummy) comprise 38% of the 
total recommendations in my sample. For those mutual fund clients that already hold 
the stocks when the analyst issues the recommendation on those stocks, the stocks 
account for 2.15% of their total portfolios on average.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
4.2.3 Political pressure 
For an analyst i employed by brokerage firm b covering stock j in quarter t, I 
say that analyst i is under political pressure to inflate his/her investment ratings on 
stock j if 1) the CEO of brokerage firm b was a government official or a military 
officer before taking the position in the brokerage firm; and 2) government agencies 
own the shares of stock j. In order to capture the political pressure defined above, I 
construct a product of two variables. One is a dummy variable CEO political dummy, 
which is equal to one if the CEO of brokerage firm b was a government official or a 
military officer before taking the position in the brokerage firm, and zero otherwise11
4.2.4 Investment banking pressure    
. 
This dummy variable captures the connection between the brokerage firm and 
government. The other variable is State own, which is percent of shares held by 
various levels of governments and their agencies at the time the recommendation is 
issued. The variable CEO_political× Stateown is a product of CEO political dummy 
and State own. I manually collect brokerage firms’ CEO political status data from the 
websites of brokerage firms. The state ownership data are available in the WIND 
Financial Database. Recommendations from politically connected brokerage firms 
comprise 43% of the total recommendations. The average state ownership of public 
listed companies is 27%.  
Previous studies indicate that investment bankers often pressure their in-house 
                                                        
11 This definition is similar to Firth et al.’s (2009a) definition of the political connections of China’s public-listed 
companies.  
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research departments to issue more optimistic reports on the stocks of their current or 
potential clients (e.g., Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely 
and Womack, 1999; Ljungvist et al., 2007). Therefore, I introduce a dummy variable 
to control for the potential preexisting investment bank relationship between analyst 
i’s brokerage firm and stock j. For an analyst i employed by brokerage firm b 
covering stock j in quarter t, the dummy variable I-bank relation dummy is equal to 
one if the investment banking department of brokerage firm b served as a lead or 
co-lead manager in j’s most recent seasoned-equity offering or debt issue prior to the 
recommendation being issued, or, if there is no seasoned-equity offering or debt issue, 
it is equal to one if brokerage firm b’s investment banking department was a lead or 
co-lead underwriter at the time of j’s initial public offering. A business relationship 
between the issuer and non-managing member of the underwriting syndicate is 
assumed to be weak (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara, 
2000; Corwin and Schultz, 2005). Only 750 recommendations are issued by analysts 
subject to investment banking pressure, representing approximately 4% of total 
recommendations. 
 
4.2.5 Company characteristics  
   I control for several firm characteristics. First, previous research studies (e.g., 
Ljungqvist et al., 2007; Mola and Guidolin, 2009) find that analysts are less likely to 
give in to investment banking or brokerage pressure when the stock is highly visible 
to institutional investors. To control for this potential effect, I follow Mola and 
Guidolin (2009) and use the variable other fund own, which is the number of the 
shares held by the other mutual funds (i.e., other than the brokerage firm b’s clients 
at the end of quarter t-1) divided by the total shares outstanding. This is a proxy for 
other institutional shareholdings in a publicly listed company12
                                                        
12 There exist other institutional investors in China’s stock market, for example, insurance company, social 
security funds. However, these institutions have only recently been allowed to participate in stock market. I 
cannot get sufficient reliable data from my data sources. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) are 
allowed to participate in China’s A-share market in late 2002. These foreign investors may impact analyst 
. Second, most listed 
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companies in China suffer from information opaqueness although companies that list 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, foreign stock exchange, or the B share market, 
which are open mainly to foreign investors, have a better information environment. 
The information environment of a firm is a deterministic factor of the analyst 
coverage decision and influences the accuracy of an analyst’s report on that firm 
(Hope, 2003). Therefore, I calculate a dummy variable (oversea list dummy) which is 
equal to one if a firm has shares traded on an overseas stock exchange (including the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange) or China B share market when the recommendation is 
issued, and zero otherwise. Table 4 shows that 15% of my sample recommendations 
are on stocks that have a foreign listing (including a B-share listing). Third, I use the 
most recent quarter-end proxy for Tobin’s Q (Q), return on assets (ROA)13
 
, and 
revenue-to-asset ratio (revenue) to capture a firm’s growth prospects, profitability, 
and efficiency, respectively. Market-to-book ratio is defined as the sum of the market 
value of equity and book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets. 
Return on assets is the quarterly earnings before interest and tax divided by total 
assets. Revenue-to-asset ratio is the total operational revenue scaled by total assets. I 
also calculate the dividend yield (div yield), which is the quarterly dividend per share 
divided by the share price at the end of the quarter. Log form of total assets (firm size) 
controls for the firm size. Each variable is lagged one quarter. Firm performance and 
firm size data are from the WIND Financial Database.   
4.2.6 Brokerage firm characteristics 
Studies in the U.S. suggest that prestigious investment banks are less likely to 
risk their reputation capital by pressuring their analysts to issue bullish reports 
(Ljungvist, Marston and Wilhelm, 2006). I therefore argue that analysts from 
internationally renowned investment banks care more about their ethical behavior 
                                                                                                                                                             
coverage decisions as well as analyst bias. Unfortunately, I am unable to find reliable data on the stockholdings of 
QFIIs. . I appreciate that one anonymous examiner raise these concerns. 
13 I use EBIT divided by total assets to calculate return on assets. Other studies use net income divided by total 
assets. The choice of numerator does not alter the qualitative results in this study. 
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and reputations than domestic brokerage firms do and therefore should be more 
conservative in their investment ratings. As a result, I use a dummy variable (foreign 
broker dummy) which is equal to one if the headquarter of the analyst’s brokerage 
firm is located overseas, and zero otherwise. According to this criterion, 4% of my 
sample recommendations are issued by analysts from foreign-based brokerage firms 
(see Table 4). As another proxy for reputation I use the years (broker experience) 
since the brokerage firm was first established in China as a control for reputation. 
Some U.S. studies use the investment bank’s share of the IPO underwriting market in 
previous years as a proxy for reputation (e.g., Ljungqvist et al., 2007). I do not use 
this proxy in my study because the international investment banks do not directly 
participate in China’s domestic IPO market14
 
. 
4.2.7 Analyst characteristics 
I also control for several analyst characteristics. First, I include an all-star 
analyst dummy. Mola and Guidolin (2009) find that all-star analysts are associated 
with more optimistic ratings. Furthermore, Hong and Kubik (2003) find that 
brokerage firms are likely to reward those analysts who promote stocks with ratings 
bolder than the consensus forecast. In this study, I use rankings from the New 
Fortune Chinese Best Analysts survey. This survey is China’s counterpart of the U.S. 
Institutional Investor survey and is conducted over a large number of buy-side 
institutions (mainly mutual fund managers) every year. For an analyst i covering a 
stock j at quarter t, I define the analyst i as an all-star analyst (all star dummy) if i 
ranks in the top three of all the analysts covering stock j’s industry according to the 
                                                        
14 The Administration Measures of Securities Issuance and Underwriting set an entry barrier for new participants 
and foreign participants in the domestic equity offering underwriting market. Three foreign investment banks 
have set up joint ventures: Gaohua-Goldman Sachs (specific ownership information is not publicly available), 
CICC (in which Morgan Stanley has a 34.3% ownership), and UBS Security Co Ltd.(in which UBS has a 30% 
ownership). According to the Security Association of China, the above three security companies only account for 
1.46%, 10.31% and 2.3% of the total security underwriting revenue, respectively, in the past six years. All the 
other foreign investment banks have never been lead or co-lead underwriters.  
Weblink: 
http://www.sac.net.cn/newcn/home/info_detail.jsp?info_id=1236073459100&info_type=CMS.STD&cate_id=811
83692051100 
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most recent New Fortune Chinese Best Analysts survey. All-star analysts issue about 
13% of my sample recommendations.  
My second variable (productivity) is the number of reports issued by analyst i as 
a proportion of the total number of analyst reports issued by the brokerage firm that i 
works for in the year when the recommendation is issued. This variable measures an 
analyst’s productivity and importance in his/her research department. The mean 
productivity is 8%. 
My third variable is the number of industries (industry coverage) that the 
analyst covers in the year when the recommendation is issued. On average, an 
individual analyst covers 2.56 2-digit CSRC industry sectors (median = 2). My last 
variable (seniority) is the number of quarters since the analyst first showed up in the 
two databases. Hong et al. (2000) find that analysts in the U.S. are less bold early in 
their careers. Previous studies suggest that an analyst’s experience has competing 
impacts on analyst optimism. On one hand, analysts with more experience in an 
industry are likely to develop superior private information that potentially reduces 
the optimism in recommendations. On the other hand, analysts with longer 
experience and a narrow focus are more likely to develop a good relationship with 
the management, making it difficult for them to question objectively managers’ 
performances. This closeness to management can result in relatively optimistic 
recommendations (Cowen et al., 2006). In my sample, seniority has a mean of 13.66 
quarters15
 
. 
4.2.8 Other controls 
I use log form of quarterly indices of the stock exchanges where the stock lists 
(log quarter index) to control for market conditions. I also define coverage_no as the 
log form of the number of analysts covering that stock (Ljungvist et al., 2007).  
                                                        
15 There are several other analyst characteristics, for example, gender and age, which may affect analyst behavior. 
Unfortunately, we do not have biological information of individual analyst. I appreciate that one examiner brings 
this suggestions to me.   
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4.2.9 Company and analyst summary statistics  
Table 5A reports the mean value of financial transparency, operational and 
financial performance, size, and ownership structure for firms receiving optimistic 
analyst coverage (relative to market consensus) and firms receiving equal-or-less 
than market consensus recommendations. I use the two-tailed t-statistic to test the 
significance of the differences in firm characteristics across these two subgroups. 
18% of the covered firms that receive favorable analyst recommendations have their 
shares listed on an overseas stock exchange as well as the domestic A share market. 
In contrast, 13% of the covered firms that have neutral or negative relative analyst 
recommendations have their shares listed on a foreign stock market. The one quarter 
lagged ROA, proxy for Tobin’s Q and revenue scaled by total assets are also higher 
for firms receiving optimistic recommendations than for firms receiving 
non-optimistic recommendations. All the differences are significant at the 1% 
significance level. These differences exist in both bull and bear markets. There is no 
significant difference in state ownership between firms receiving optimistic 
investment ratings and firms receiving non-optimistic investment ratings. In contrast, 
there is weak evidence that more optimistic forecasts are given to stocks with higher 
institutional share ownership. Overall, analysts tend to give recommendations that 
are more favorable to firms that have a more transparent information environment, 
higher profitability and efficiency, as well as better growth prospects.        
In Table 5B, I compare the recommendations issued by analysts from 
foreign-based brokerage firms against recommendations issued by analysts from 
domestic brokerage firms, as well as all-star analyst recommendations and other 
analyst recommendations. I find that the proportions of “strong buy” and “buy” 
recommendations issued by analysts from foreign-based brokerage firms are 
significantly lower than those recommendations issued by analysts from domestic 
brokerage firms. This difference confirms my earlier conjecture that analysts from 
internationally renowned brokerage firms make recommendations that are more 
conservative because they are more concerned with their reputation capital. 
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Interestingly, all-star analysts are more optimistic than ordinary analysts are in terms 
of the proportion of “strong buy” ratings and for the average ratings and for the 
average ratings relative to market consensus. Thus, the designation of a coveted 
all-star ranking is associated with more optimistic recommendations.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
4.3 Mutual fund pressure and political pressure on analyst recommendations 
4.3.1 Univariate analysis 
    Table 6A provides univariate analyses on the impact of the stockholdings of 
mutual fund clients on analyst optimism over the whole sample period and in bull 
and bear market periods16
                                                        
16 The bull market period lasts from June 6th, 2005 to October 16th, 2007. The rest of my sample period are bear 
market periods. 
. For an analyst i employed by brokerage firm b covering 
stock j in quarter t, portfolio weight is defined as the per cent weight of stock j in the 
mutual fund clients’ portfolios at the end of quarter t-1. During my sample period, 
the median value of portfolio weight is 0.81%. Analysts are more optimistic (both in 
absolute levels and relative levels to market consensus) toward stocks that are held 
more heavily by their mutual fund clients. From the first tercile (low portfolio weight) 
to the third tercile (high portfolio weight), the average analyst investment rating 
increases from 3.98 to 4.27, and the average analyst optimism relative to market 
consensus increases from less optimistic than market consensus (-0.08) in the first 
tercile to more optimistic than market consensus (0.11) in the third tercile. I identify 
a similar trend in the bear market period, while in the bull market period, the 
difference in analyst optimism is not so apparent across the three terciles of portfolio 
weights. Both the average recommendation and the average recommendation relative 
to market consensus are statistically higher for analyst coverage on stocks held by 
mutual fund clients than those for analyst coverage on stocks not held by mutual 
fund clients (based on the two-tailed t-test). These differences exist in both bull 
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market and bear market periods. The evidence provides prima facie evidence in 
support of my argument that analyst optimism is driven by the stock holdings of 
brokerage firms’ mutual fund clients.      
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
Table 6B tests analyst optimism for politically connected brokerage firms on 
state-owned shares. Analysts from politically connected brokerage firms are more 
optimistic about state-owned listed shares than are analysts from 
non-politically-connected brokerage firms, both in terms of average ratings and in 
terms of average ratings relative to market consensus. Two-tailed t-tests confirm the 
statistical significance of differences in optimism and this result holds both bull and 
bear market periods. Overall, the univariate test results in Table 6B confirm my 
argument that analysts from politically connected brokerage firms are under pressure 
to issue more optimistic recommendations (than market consensus) on state-owned 
shares.  
 
4.3.2 Multivariate analysis 
In this section, I conduct the multivariate analysis using the following empirical 
model: 
ijtijtititjtijt RABCF ε++++= −1  
Where ijtF  is analyst i’s stock recommendations (relative to consensus) for 
company j at time t. 1−jtC  is the one quarter lagged vector of company 
characteristics as described in section 4.2.5. itB  and itA  control for the brokerage 
firm characteristics and analyst characteristics described in sections 4.2.6 and 4.2.7, 
respectively. ijtR  captures the strength of the pressures from mutual fund clients, 
politically-connected brokerage firm CEOs and investment banking departments 
(described in sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.4, respectively) when analyst i issues a 
recommendation on stock j in quarter t .  
The estimation model suggests a three dimensional panel set-up, which has 
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variation in three dimensions: analyst i, stock j, and recommendation quarter t. The 
unit of observation is an analyst i making a recommendation for company j in quarter 
t. However, there is no standard routine for the estimation of three-dimensional panel 
data17
Table 7 presents my focal empirical results. In all columns, the dependent 
variable is analyst recommendation relative to market consensus as defined in section 
4.2.1. In columns 1 and 2, I only include one key variable-----the stock’s weight in 
the portfolio of the mutual fund clients, which captures the impact of mutual fund 
clients’ pressure on analyst optimism. Commission, the proportion of trading 
commissions earned from the mutual funds that hold stock j (see section 4.2.2) enters 
into the model in columns 3 and 4 as an additional proxy for the pressure from 
mutual fund clients. The political pressure proxy enters into the regression in 
columns 5 and 6. As a robustness check, the last column presents empirical results 
from an ordered probit that models the three-level choice facing a typical analyst: 
issuing an above, at, or below consensus report. In columns 1, 3 and 5, I estimate the 
model using a panel GLS regression with random analyst effects. Columns 2, 4 and 6 
report the empirical results with random stock effects.  
. I follow the literature (Ljungqvist et al., 2007) and estimate the model by 
focusing on one of the two random effects at a time. Specifically, I first include 
random analyst effects to remove the unobserved heterogeneity across different 
analysts, while ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity across stocks. Then I include 
random stock effects to remove the unobserved heterogeneity across stocks while 
ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity across different analysts.  
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
There are positive and statistically significant coefficients on related holding 
and commission in all of my models. These results are consistent with my arguments. 
Here, analysts are subjected to pressure or incentives from their brokerage firms to 
inflate their recommendations on the stocks that are already held by the broker’s 
mutual fund clients. The pressure increases as the stock’s weight in the mutual fund 
                                                        
17 Antweiler (2001) develops a random estimator for the special multi-dimensional panel in which the random 
effects are nested. However, in my model, the panel dimensions are not nested.  
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clients’ portfolios increase or as the commission payments earned from those mutual 
fund clients that hold the stock increase (i.e., the commissions constitute a larger 
portion of total stock trading commission income from all mutual funds).  
Preexisting underwriting ties between the company and the analyst’s brokerage 
firm are positively and significantly related to optimistic analyst behavior, as 
indicated by the positive and significant coefficients on I-bank relation dummy. This 
result confirms that the well-documented investment banking pressure on analyst 
behavior in the U.S. also exists in China even though the underwriting fees constitute 
a small amount of brokerage firms’ total revenues.  
My proxy for the political pressure faced by analysts (Ceo_political×Stateown) 
is significantly and positively related to analysts’ relative recommendations. The 
politically connected CEOs from brokerage firms pressure their in-house analysts to 
look more favorably (than market consensus) on firms that have high state ownership. 
The coefficient on state ownership (State own) becomes negative and significant 
when I include the political pressure variable in my regression. The negative and 
significant coefficients on state ownership indicate that the analysts are reluctant to 
make more favorable recommendations than market consensus on state controlled 
stocks. However, this conservative approach toward state controlled listed firms is 
modified if the CEO of the brokerage firm is politically connected to the government 
or state. Taking together the signs on state ownership and the interactive term 
between state ownership and the dummy for politically connected broker, we 
conclude that apart from pressure from business ties between brokerage firms and 
their mutual fund clients, analysts from politically connected brokerage firms bear 
additional pressure to bias their reports upward for listed firms that have high state 
ownership.     
Some of the control variables are associated with analyst optimism. Analysts 
employed by internationally renowned investment banks are more conservative in 
issuing optimistic recommendations relative to market consensus, as indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficients on foreign broker dummy. The coefficient on 
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other fund own is negative and significant in most regressions, providing evidence 
for the conjecture that the presence of other mutual funds holding the stock 
moderates analyst optimism; a similar finding is also reported in the U.S. (Ljungqvist 
et al., 2007)18. Consistent with Mola and Guidolin (2009) I also find that all-star 
analysts issue more optimistic recommendations. Analysts at longer-established 
brokerages give more optimistic stock recommendations. All-star analysts are also 
likely to issue more aggressive reports19
4.4 Endogenous coverage selection 
.  
My results might be driven by the fact that analysts strategically choose which 
stocks to cover. Previous research suggests that analysts selectively choose to publish 
reports about stocks that are held primarily by institutional investors (O’Brien and 
Bushman, 1990) and which they have positive views on (McNichols and O'Brien, 
1997). Econometrically, this means that I observe a recommendation on a stock only 
if the analyst thinks it worthwhile to cover the stock. I offer two robustness checks to 
address this endogenous selection problem. Firstly, analysts usually have little 
discretion with respect to covering large firms and so selection bias will be negligible 
when I restrict my sample to relatively larger firms (Kolasinski and Kothari, 2007). 
As indicated in the first two columns of Table 8, I obtain qualitatively similar results 
when I restrict my sample to firms whose sizes are higher than the industry median 
firm size.     
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
Secondly, I re-estimate my model using the Heckman selection model20
                                                        
18 Due to the short history of China’s mutual fund industry, China’s mutual funds lack on efficient ways and 
expertise to monitor conflicted behaviors in equity research industry compared to their US counterpart. The 
coefficient on other fund own is less significant than that in US studies (e.g. Ljungqvist, et, al, 2007). 
 that 
19 The coefficients on the All star dummy and Broker experience are positive and significant in columns 2, 4, and 
6, but are not significant in columns 1, 3, and 5. The loss of significance could be driven by the inclusion of 
analyst random effects in the three columns.    
20 Recently, a few studies reveal the limitation of Heckman selection model in correcting self-selection bias. For 
example, Clatworthy, Makepeace and Peel (2009) , as well as Francis and Lennox (2009), point out that Heckman 
two-step estimates are highly sensitive to changes in sample and model specification, particularly the absense of a 
valid instrumental variable. However, in this study, Heckman selection is practically feasible whereas other 
self-selection models, such as propensity score matching model, are difficult or impossible to implement. I am 
grateful for helpful comments from one examiner.   
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ignores any random effects. It is computationally infeasible to use the Heckman 
selection model in the presence of random effects because of my large sample size 
when I include all the cases in which a given brokerage firm b could provide research 
on stock j in a given quarter t. My procedure is as follows. I first create every 
possible banking-stock quarter, whether or not an analyst in a given brokerage firm 
covers a given stock in that quarter. Then I delete all the observations before a stock 
first enters into my sample or after it permanently leaves the sample. This strategy 
results in 514,729 possible bank-stock-quarter observations. The active coverage 
observations comprise 18,790 bank-stock quarters (3.7% of all the potential 
bank-stock quarters). 
I use two instruments in my first step modeling of the analyst coverage decision. 
Firstly, I follow Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and use the number of existing 
recommendations from analyst i’s brokerage firm that cover stocks belonging to 
stock j’s CSRC industry 21
Secondly, I add a geographical coverage instrument. Using U.S. data, Malloy 
(2005) finds that geographic location and proximity are important determinants of 
the information advantages of some analysts over others. In China, regional 
development is very unbalanced. Therefore, some brokerage firms may develop 
information or expertise advantages in some specific regions and they are therefore 
more likely to cover the firms in those regions. Following this rationale, I argue that 
the broader the brokerage firm’s existing coverage of the region in which firm j’s 
headquarter is located, the more expertise and knowledge the brokerage firm has and 
 as a proportion of the number of total existing 
recommendations issued by that brokerage firm (broker industry cover). Ljungqvist 
et al. (2006) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) suggest that the broader the brokerage 
firm’s existing coverage on firm j’s Fama and French three-factor industry (1997), 
the lower the cost of covering firm j is. Therefore, the analysts in that brokerage firm 
are more likely to cover stock j.  
                                                        
21 The CSRC industry classification incorporates several international classification methodologies, including 
CUSIP, SIC and Fama-French Industry classification (see the Guidelines of Industrial Classification on China’s 
Listed Companies, 2001, published by the CSRC). 
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its analysts are more likely to initiate coverage of the firms in the same location. 
Therefore, my second instrumental variable is the number of existing 
recommendations from analyst i’s brokerage firm that cover firms whose 
headquarters are in the same location as stock j as a proportion of the number of total 
existing recommendations issued by that brokerage firm (broker region cover). 
Location is defined by major city (Beijing, Shanghai) and province.           
The last four columns of Table 8 present the results. The inverse Mill’s Lambda 
are statistically significant at the 5% level or less, confirming the existence of 
selection bias.  The positive and significant coefficients on the two instruments 
confirm that analysts are more likely to cover a stock if more stocks in the same 
industry and same location are already covered by the analysts’ research departments. 
Furthermore, the probability that an analyst will cover a stock increases with the size 
of that stock in the portfolios of the mutual fund clients. This result further 
corroborates my initial finding that analysts have incentives to cater to the needs of 
their business-related mutual funds. Analysts from politically connected brokerage 
firms are inclined to publish reports on state-owned stocks.  Not surprisingly, stocks 
of large firms (in terms of total assets) receive disproportionately more analyst 
coverage (Hayes, 1998). Moreover, the firms that are more profitable and more 
efficient also receive more analyst coverage. The evidence shows that analysts 
strategically select which stocks to cover. Analysts from internationally renowned 
brokerage firms issue research reports less frequently.      
The results in the second step in Table 8 mirror the results in Table 7. The 
coefficients on pressure from mutual fund clients (related holding and commission), 
political pressure (Ceo_political×Stateown) and investment banking pressure (I-bank 
relation dummy) are positive and significant, with similar statistical significance 
levels as the corresponding coefficients in Table 7. The other control variables also 
yield similar results. 
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4.5 The composition of mutual fund clients 
    So far, I have shown that the stockholdings of mutual fund clients help 
determine analyst optimism. However, the characteristics of mutual fund clients vary 
across brokerage firms, for example, the size of the individual mutual fund client 
itself. This variation implies that I can gain further insights into the effect of mutual 
fund clients’ stockholdings on analyst optimism by considering the size of the mutual 
fund clients. It is plausible that larger mutual fund clients are more influential for the 
following two reasons. Firstly, mutual fund size is correlated with the potential 
commissions that the mutual fund can allocate among brokerage firms. Secondly, the 
size of assets under management of a mutual fund investor determines the weighting 
the mutual fund investor has when voting in the New Fortune Chinese Best Analysts 
survey. 
    To examine the client-size hypothesis, for an analyst i working for brokerage 
firm b covering stock j in quarter t, I first identify the largest mutual funds (top 20%) 
in terms of total equity value under management at the most recent year end. Then I 
construct two variables to decompose the aggregate level of stockholding by b’s 
mutual fund clients: large related holding, which captures the weight of stock j in the 
aggregate portfolio of b’s large mutual fund clients; and small related holding, which 
is the weight of stock j in the portfolio of b’s other mutual fund clients22
I re-estimate the random effects model in the first four columns in Table 7, using 
the large related holding and small related holding instead of the aggregate weight of 
covered stock in mutual fund clients’ portfolios. As indicated in Table 9, the 
coefficient of large related holding is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level, while the coefficient on small related holding is statistically 
insignificant (except in column 2 where the coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level). 
This result is robust when I incorporate commission into my model in the last four 
columns. Analysts care mainly about the stockholdings of large mutual fund clients 
.  
                                                        
22 The detailed construction of these two variables is similar to the construction of the variable related holding in 
section 3.2.   
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and tend to make bolder recommendations on the stocks heavily held by big mutual 
fund clients in order to maintain good relationships with them.   
[TABLE 9 HERE]  
 
4.6 Mutual fund reactions to the recommendations 
    Anecdotal evidence in the U.S. suggests that the mutual funds can benefit from 
upward-biased analyst reports by divesting their positions on stocks that are touted 
by their affiliated analysts (e.g., Morgenson, 2001). To gain some further insight into 
the benefit that accrues to mutual fund clients from analyst optimism on their large 
stockholdings, I estimate a fixed effects panel regression model in which the change 
in weight of the stock in mutual fund clients’ portfolios (between the end of quarter t 
and the end of quarter t-1) is explained by a number of variables, including a dummy 
for analyst optimism relative to market consensus.  
As indicated in Table 10, the coefficients of both one quarter lagged analyst 
optimism and current analyst optimism are negative and significant, indicating that 
both the past and present analyst optimism on the stock are negatively related to 
changes in the weight of that stock in mutual fund clients’ portfolios. A strong buy or 
buy recommendation will likely boost a stock’s price, other things being equal. If the 
mutual funds believe the stock price of a specific analyst-recommended share is 
pumped too high they will sell that share to realize a gain. Thus the mutual fund 
benefits if the analyst at the brokerage they do business with makes a biased 
recommendation and the brokerage benefits from the business it does with the 
mutual fund. Such stock price manipulation is also prevalent in other emerging 
markets (e.g., Khwaja and Mian, 2005b).  
[TABLE 10 HERE] 
Changes in other mutual fund holdings of the stock and changes in the number 
of other mutual funds that hold the stock are significantly and positively related to 
the change in the stock’s weight in the mutual fund clients’ portfolios, which is 
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consistent with Mola and Guidolin’s (2009) finding. Mutual fund clients also 
increase their exposure to a company’s stock when the operational performance, 
dividend yield and market price of the company improve and when the market index 
increases. 
My results help to allay concerns of reverse causality, where positive investment 
recommendations drive stock purchases by the mutual funds. I find the opposite. 
Mutual funds actually reduce their holdings of stocks that receive favorable 
recommendations from business-related analysts. This gives us confidence that the 
stockholdings of mutual funds influence analysts’ recommendations and not 
vice-versa23
 
.    
4.7 Bull and Bear market analysis on analyst optimism 
In this section, I focus on testing whether the pressures from institutional clients 
and from the government affect analysts’ behavior differently in bull market and bear 
market periods. As described previously, I define the bull market period as June 6th 
2005 to October 16th 2007, and the rest of my sample period is defined as a bear 
market24
Table 11 presents the regression results. Columns 1 and 3 present the regression 
results with panel analyst random effects while columns 2 and 4 present the 
regression results with panel stock random effects. Columns 1 and 2 show the results 
when I only include the recommendations issued during the bear market period. The 
last two columns present the results when I restrict my sample to the bull market 
period. The coefficients on related holding and commission are positive and 
significant in all columns. However, the coefficients on Ceo_political×Stateown are 
. I do a split-sample analysis according to the market condition. I estimate 
the model in the same way as described in Section 4.3.2.   
                                                        
23 In Table 7 I address this issue by using lagged related holding. The implications from Table 8 are consistent 
with those from Table 7. 
24 This classification is widely acknowledged in the financial community. During the bull market period, the 
Shanghai Composite Stock Index surged from 1,100 points to over 6,000 points. During the bear market period 
that began in October 2007, the same index plunged from over 6,000 points to slightly higher than 2,000 points 
and has remained low since that time. 
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only positive and significant during the bear market period, indicating that political 
pressure is stronger during a bear market period. The government may ask its former 
employees, who are now CEOs in the brokerage firms, to impose more pressure on 
their analysts to inflate their recommendations on the stocks of state-owned 
companies in an attempt to preserve corporate values during market downturns. All 
the signs and significance levels of the other variables are qualitatively unchanged. In 
sum, the split-sample analysis indicates that analysts recommend stocks held by 
mutual fund clients in order to win the lucrative trading commission allotment from 
mutual funds regardless of market conditions. What is more, my analysis suggests 
that political pressure is used as a type of corporate bailout by the government when 
the economy is poor. This is similar in spirit to other bailout strategies documented in 
the literature, such as easy access to external financing for politically connected firms 
during financial crises (Faccio et al., 2006).      
 
4.8 Stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism 
4.8.1 Short-term stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism 
In this section, I compare the 3-day market reaction to analyst recommendations 
on stocks that mutual fund clients already hold and recommendations on stocks that 
mutual fund clients do not hold. Day zero represents the analyst recommendation 
date. I use the standard market model (Sharpe, 1963) to compute the abnormal 
returns. The estimation period is from day -126 to day -7 before the analyst 
recommendation and the market index is the equally weighted returns on all stocks 
on the Shanghai or Shenzhen index (stock j is listed on either the Shanghai or the 
Shenzhen stock exchange). I categorize the mean 3-day abnormal return by the 
optimism of analyst coverage relative to market consensus and by the 
recommendation rating. 
Table 12A shows that optimistic fund-related stock recommendations generate a 
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statistically significant (p<.01) positive return of 0.57%. Thus, the mutual fund client 
benefits from the favorable recommendations as the value of their portfolios increase. 
The positive performance is most pronounced for “strong buy” and “buy” 
recommendations. A negative stock return, -0.34%, is observed for sell 
recommendations. In sum, the recommendations have a positive effect on stock 
prices. Table 12A also shows that the returns for independent stock recommendations 
are significantly greater than for fund-related recommendations (for strong buy and 
buy). This implies that investors are able to recognize the optimistic bias in 
business-related analyst recommendations and discount the stock prices. 
[TABLE 12 HERE] 
 
4.8.2 Long-term stock returns associated with Analyst Optimism 
I also examine the long run returns that accrue to investors acting on the 
investment recommendations. In particular, for every recommendation in my sample, 
I systematically act upon each recommendation by buying stock that receives a 
“strong buy” or “buy” rating and selling stock that receives an “under perform” or 
“sell” rating. I classify the recommendations into two categories: recommendations 
on stocks held by mutual fund clients and recommendations on stocks not held by 
mutual fund clients (independent recommendations). Each optimistic 
recommendation is assumed to stop influencing investment behavior 250 trading 
days after its report date unless the same analyst on the same stock issues a 
downgrade to “under perform or sell”. In these cases, the returns are measured up to 
the date of the change in recommendation (the downgrade). Similarly, each 
pessimistic recommendation is assumed to stop influencing investment behavior 250 
days after its report date unless an upgrade to “buy” or “strong buy” is made by the 
same analyst on the same stock. Following Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007), I 
compute the average daily raw return, market-adjusted abnormal return, and 
abnormal returns from the market model.  
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Table 12B presents the results. Investing systematically upon optimistic 
recommendations relative to market consensus on stocks held by mutual fund clients 
produces an economically large and statistically negative mean daily market-adjusted 
return of -0.181%. The same investment strategy on stocks not held by mutual fund 
clients generates a daily market-adjusted return of -0.064%, which is not significant. 
For recommendations that are equal to or less optimistic than market consensus, the 
investment returns of recommendations on stocks held by mutual fund clients are 
higher than those of recommendations on stocks that are not held by mutual fund 
clients. However, the differences are not statistically significant. 
Overall, the optimistic analyst recommendations on stocks held by mutual fund 
clients are associated with poorer investment returns compared to other analyst 
recommendations. Therefore, my results on the short-term and long-term investment 
returns from following the recommendations on the stocks that are held by mutual 
fund clients against the stocks with no mutual fund client holding refute the argument 
that analysts are more optimistic than market consensus because they have superior 
stock-picking ability. These results corroborate my other test results that find that 
analyst optimism on stocks held by mutual fund clients reflect one type of conflict of 
interest facing a typical analyst: analysts are sacrificing their objectivity by issuing 
optimistic reports on stocks held by mutual fund clients because of competition for 
favorable appraisals from mutual fund managers and competition for trading 
commissions allocated by the mutual fund industry. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
There is a growing awareness that there are substantial conflicts of interest in 
the financial services industry and these conflicts can lead to biased and even 
fraudulent actions by agents. A great deal of publicity has been given to cases where 
conflicts of interest have lead to substantial losses to investors. Examples include 
front-running, insider trading on price-sensitive information, ponzi-schemes [e.g., 
Madoff, Stanford], biased analysts reports, and corporate scandals [Enron, Worldcom, 
Parmalot, Ahold, HIH]. Most of the publicity relating to conflicts of interest comes 
from the U.S. although other countries are not immune to these problems. Likewise, 
most of the research on conflicts of interest comes from the U.S. 
My study extends prior research by examining another potential conflict of 
interest, namely analysts’ giving favorable recommendations on stocks already held 
by the brokerage’s mutual fund clients. Here, the analysts’ bias their 
recommendations to win more brokerage commissions from the client. Opposite to 
the conventional view that analysts provide independent advice to clients, I argue 
that the clients influence the analysts’ recommendations. My research extends prior 
studies (e.g., Mola and Guidolin, 2009) by examining the relations between mutual 
funds clients and brokerages that have business relations but no common ownership. 
Furthermore, I carry out my study using Chinese data. One advantage in doing this is 
that detailed commission fee data are available and this leads to finer tests than can 
be done with U.S. data. China is also an interesting setting for my research because 
very little is known about the financial services sector despite its extraordinary 
growth in the past ten years. 
Using data on brokerage analysts’ reports on Chinese stocks from 2004 to 2008, 
I find that ‘buy’ and ‘strong buy’ recommendations are made on stocks that are 
already owned by mutual fund clients of the brokerage. The evidence supports my 
argument that mutual funds pressure brokerages and their analysts to issue optimistic 
 43  
recommendations on selected stocks (i.e., the stocks in the mutual funds portfolios). 
This pressure is greatest from large mutual fund clients and it occurs in both bull and 
bear markets. The state also exerts pressure on analysts’ recommendations. In 
particular, some brokerages have political connections with the state and the analysts 
at these brokerages give recommendations that are more favorable to state-controlled 
listed firms although this effect is more pronounced in bear markets. 
I find that in the short-term, stock prices do increase after a favorable 
investment recommendation and so mutual funds’ performances improve. 
Furthermore, some mutual funds take advantage of a favorable investment 
recommendation by selling some of the recommended stocks. This positive stock 
price reaction is tempered by the fact that favorable recommendations on 
client-unrelated stocks earn even higher returns. Thus, investors recognize the analyst 
optimism and discount the share prices where there is a potential conflict of interest. 
In the longer-term, a policy of buying recommended stocks where there is a potential 
conflict of interest results in negative returns.  
Finally, my study suffers some limitations. Two of the most important dimensions 
in an analyst report are buy or sell recommendations and forecasts of company 
earnings. While I examine the former, I do not examine the impact of mutual fund 
clients on analyst earnings forecasts because reliable data on analyst forecasts are 
unavailable at the time the study was conducted. In future work it will be interesting 
to expand my study to examine analyst earnings forecasts. Another limitation is that I 
do not have detailed information on the trading transactions of institutional investors. 
It is widely reported that institutional traders receive tips regarding the contents of 
forthcoming analysts’ reports (Irvine, Lipson, Puckett, 2007). It would therefore be 
useful to examine the trading of institutions immediately before the release of 
analysts’ initial buy recommendations. Unfortunately, the daily trading data of 
institutional investors is classified information and not available to researchers. If 
such information becomes available in the future, this will permit a detailed 
examination of mutual fund clients’ trading behavior around the release of analyst 
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reports and this should yield interesting results. 
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Table 1 Mutual fund industry and security firms in China 
 
Table 1A Mutual fund industry  
 
 The Evolution of China's Mutual Fund Industry 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number of 
Fund management companies 
New 0 5 6 12 12 8 4 3 
Cumulative Total 10 15 21 33 45 53 57 60 
Number of Funds Total 34 51 72 114 166 231 323 368 
Net Asset Value 
(in billion yuan) Total 84.56 81.80 124.40 176.24 327.28 510.39 818.48 3275.40 
% of tradable shares held by mutual funds   - - - 4.1% 4.6% 6.1% 9.4% 15.9% 
% of tradable shares held by top 5 fund houses    - 1.8% 1.8% 2.4% 3.8% 5.0% 
Net asset value of the top 5 fund houses (in billion 
yuan) 84.56 42.38 54.09 67.42 131.06 212.20 332.92 1023.56 
net asset value of the top 5 fund houses as a 
percent of total net asset value of mutual fund 
industry 
100 51.81 43.48 38.25 40.42 41.58 40.68 31.25 
Source: compiled from www.jrj.com (webpage of “China Financial Industry”) 
Web Link: http://news1.jrj.com.cn/news/2007-01-05/000001897594.html 
 
Table 1B Brokerage firms  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
 
 
Annual operation 
income (in billion 
Yuan) 
Total operation 
income 
15.4 14.2 15.7 13.4 69.7 315.2 
Security trading 
commission 
7.8 7.4 10.2 8.4 37.1 174.4 
% of total 
operation income 
51.8% 52.2% 64.7% 62.5% 53.3% 55.3% 
Equity 
underwriting 
income 
1.5 1.4 1.8 2.4 6.3 10.2 
% of total 
operation income 
9.9% 9.8% 11.2% 17.6% 9.1% 3.2% 
Gross profit (in billion Yuan) -0.4 0.9 -1.4 -4.2 30.1 205.9 
Net Profit  -1.0 0.3 -4.4 -5.6 25.8 141.1 
Source: compiled from the WIND Financial Database 
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Table 2 Definitions of variables 
 
Variables  
Relative recommendation 
 
Relation dummy 
Individual investment recommendation minus the market consensus (the mean value of investment ratings of 
all the analysts covering the same stock in the same quarter). 
A dummy variable which is coded as one if the stock recommendation covers a firm that is already held by 
the brokerage’s mutual fund clients. 
Related holding  The weight of the stock covered by analyst i in quarter t in the aggregate portfolio of the mutual fund clients of i’s brokerage firm in quarter t-1. 
Commission 
 
 
Total commission payments from mutual fund clients that already hold stock j (covered by analyst i) to 
analyst i’s brokerage firm as a proportion of the total trading commission from institutional investors to i’s 
brokerage firm in quarter t-1. 
CEO political dummy A dummy that is equal to one if the CEO of a security firm was a government official or a military officer before taking the position in the brokerage firm, zero otherwise. 
State own  
Ceo_politicalxStateown 
Percent of shares owned by various levels of governments and its agencies. 
The interaction of the CEO political dummy and State own. 
Other fund own The percent ratio between the shares held by un-related mutual funds and total shares outstanding of the firm. 
Oversea list dummy A dummy that is equal to one if a firm has shares traded in an overseas stock exchange or China B share market when the recommendation is issued, zero otherwise. 
ROA                                     Return on assets of the covered firm. 
Q                                   The sum of the market value of equity and book value of long-term debt, divided by the book value of total assets. 
Revenue  Operational revenue divided by total assets.  
Firm size            Log form of total assets. 
Div yield Quarterly dividend per share divided by the closing stock price at the end of each quarter. 
Foreign broker dummy A dummy that is equal to one if the headquarter of the analyst’s brokerage firm is located overseas, zero otherwise. 
Broker experience Number of years since the brokerage firm first established in China. 
All star dummy  A dummy that is equal to one if the analyst is an “all-star” analyst when he/she issues the recommendation according to the most recent New Fortune Chinese Best Analysts survey. 
Productivity 
The number of analyst reports issued by analyst i as a proportion of the total number of analyst reports issued 
by the brokerage firm that i works for. 
Industry coverage The number of industries that the analyst covers. 
Seniority Number of quarters since the analyst first showed up in the two databases. 
I-bank relation dummy A dummy that is equal to one if the analyst’s brokerage firm served as a lead or co-lead manager in the most recent equity or debt issue prior to the time the recommendation is issued, zero otherwise. 
broker industry cover 
 
 
broker region cover 
 
 
The number of existing recommendations from analyst i’s brokerage firm that cover stocks belonging to 
stock j’s industry as a proportion of the number of total existing recommendations issued by that brokerage 
firm. 
The number of existing recommendations from analyst i’s brokerage firm that cover firms whose 
headquarters are in the same location as stock j as a proportion of the number of total existing 
recommendations issued by that brokerage firm. 
Coverage number Log form of number of analysts covering the stock in quarter t. 
Log quarter index Log form of quarterly market index of the stock exchange on which the stock lists. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of analyst-stock observations 
 
     Table 3A Descriptive statistics of analyst recommendation codes 
 
 2004-2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 First half of 2008 
 No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
5(strong buy) 5,107 27.18 80 16.19 178 11.10 745 24.28 2,338 28.28 1,766 32.96 
4(buy) 8,323 44.29 134 27.13 505 31.48 1,132 36.90 3,931 47.56 2,621 48.92 
3(hold) 4,597 24.47 188 38.06 693 43.20 1,010 32.92 1,814 21.95 892 16.65 
2(under perform) 571 3.04 47 9.51 155 9.66 142 4.63 156 1.89 71 1.33 
1(sell) 192 1.02 45 9.11 73 4.55 39 1.27 27 0.33 8 0.15 
No. of recommendations 18,790 494 1,604 3,068 8,685 5,409 
No. of brokerage firms 59 33 40 44 55 50 
No. of analysts 1,613 236 483 632 1,014 912 
No. of covered firms  1,354 323 762 870 1,054 833 
Average recommendation 3.94 3.31 3.34 3.78 4.02 4.13 
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Table 3B Descriptive statistics for the sample of analyst-stock observations   
 
The sample consists of 18,790 firm-analyst observation from the 1st quarter of 2004 to the 2nd 
quarter of 2008, using data from the WIND Financial Database and Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimation System (I/B/E/S). I reverse the original recommendation code in the database, i.e. the 
recommendation score ranges from 1(sell) to 5 (strong buy). For cases in which the same analyst 
issues more than one different recommendation on a stock in quarter t, I keep the first 
recommendations he/she issues in that quarter. I remove all the recommendations staying in the 
databases for more than two years since they are likely to be stale. Furthermore, I remove all the 
recommendations in which the issuers’ (analysts’) names are missing because I cannot have any 
analyst-specific information on those recommendations. The two screening strategies result in 
18,790 active recommendations. Industry classification follows the CSRC industry classification. 
The three kinds of pressures are defined in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
 Number of 
stocks  
% of the no. of stocks in 
the same category 
% of the sample 
recommendations 
Covered stocks  1,354 79.93% 100% 
Stock exchange    
Shanghai A share  744 87.22% 62.38% 
Shanghai B share 10 18.52% 0.26% 
Shenzhen A share 590 80.60% 37.03% 
Shenzhen B share 10 18.18% 0.33% 
Industry    
Manufacturing and Mining 836 79.69% 59.76% 
Info Tech 82 75.47% 5.15% 
Utility  55 81.81% 4.49% 
Finance and Properties 116 86.43% 11.21% 
Other 265 82.86% 19.39% 
Pressures    
Stocks held by mutual fund clients 607 35.83% 38.41% 
State-owned shares covered by 
politically connected analysts 
900 53.13% 27.13% 
Stocks underwritten by analysts’ 
security firms 
352 20.78% 3.92% 
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Table 4 Summary statistics 
 
Variables Number of obs. Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Recommendation     
Relative recommendation 18,790 -0.01 0 0.58 
Mutual fund pressure     
Related holding  18,721 0.004 0 0.007 
Commission 18,790 0.08 0.01 0.18 
Firm Characteristics     
State own  18,514 0.27 0.26 0.26 
Other fund own 18,790 0.14 0.08 0.17 
Oversea list dummy 18,655 0.15 0 0.36 
ROA                                     18,548 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Q                                   16,265 2.35 1.75 1.98 
Revenue  18,509 0.21 0.17 0.18 
Firm size            18,665 13.27 12.96 1.75 
Div yield 18,790 0.004 0 0.026 
Broker Characteristics     
Foreign broker dummy 18,790 0.04 0 0.19 
CEO political dummy 18,790 0.43 0 0.50 
Broker experience  18,790 7.61 9 2.20 
Analyst Characteristics     
All star dummy  18,790 0.13 0 0.34 
Productivity 18,790 0.08 0.05 0.10 
Industry coverage 18,790 2.56 2 1.69 
Seniority (quarters) 18,790 13.66 10 11.88 
Investment bank pressure     
I-bank relation dummy 18,790 0.04 0 0.19 
Other controls     
Coverage no 18,790 4.26 3 3.56 
Quarter index 18,748 5995.81 4058.59 4660.85 
The sample consists of 18,790 firm-broker observation from the 1st quarter of 2004 to the 2nd 
quarter of 2008, representing the data from the WIND Financial Database and Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimation System (I/B/E/S). The definitions of variables are provided in Table 2. 
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Table 5 Firm characteristics and analyst characteristics for stocks receiving investment ratings 
 
Panel 5A Firm characteristics for stocks receiving investment ratings 
 
 All time periods Bull market period Bear market period 
 Above market 
consensus 
Equal or below 
mkt consensus 
Difference Above market 
consensus 
Equal or below 
mkt consensus 
Difference Above market 
consensus 
Equal or below 
mkt consensus 
Difference 
Financial transparency          
Oversea list 0.18 0.13 0.04*** 0.15 0.12 0.03*** 0.20 0.16 0.04*** 
Firm performance           
ROA                                      0.05 0.04 0.01*** 0.04 0.035 0.005*** 0.051 0.047 0.004*** 
Q                                   2.62 2.21 0.41*** 3.32 2.92 0.40*** 1.92 1.68 0.24*** 
Revenue  0.22 0.20 0.01*** 0.21 0.20 0.01*** 0.22 0.21 0.01*** 
Div yield 0.004 0.005 -0.001*** 0.006 0.007 -0.001* 0.002 0.002 0.000* 
 Firm size                    
Firm size 13.57 13.11 0.46*** 13.33 12.87 0.46*** 13.81 13.42 0.39*** 
Ownership structure          
State own  0.27 0.27 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.00 
Institutional own 0.14 0.13 0.01* 0.13 0.12 0.01* 0.16 0.15 0.01* 
Mean values of variables for financial transparency, firm performance, firm size and ownership structure are presented in respective rows. Difference is the 
comparison of the average values between firms receiving more favorable rating and firms receiving equal-or-less than market consensus ratings. I use a standard 
two-tail t-test to test the statistical significance of the differences. “***” and “*” stand for 1% significance level and 10% significance level, respectively. Bull market 
period is from June 6th, 2005 to October 16th, 2007; the rest of my sample period is a bear market period.     
 
Panel 5B Analyst characteristics for stocks receiving investment ratings 
 
 No. of ratings Strong buy Buy  Hold or worse Average ratings Average (Rec.-consensus) 
Foreign broker 726 6.61% 29.48% 63.91% 3.15*** -0.54*** 
Domestic broker 18,064 28.01% 44.89% 27.10% 3.97 0.004 
“All star” analyst 2,546 36.17% 41.08% 22.75% 4.11*** 0.10*** 
Non- “all star” analyst 16,244 25.77% 44.80% 29.43% 3.91 -0.03 
I exclude the sample recommendations where the analysts’ names are ambiguous. An analyst is from a foreign security firm if the headquarters of the analyst’s 
security firm is located overseas. For an analyst i covering a stock j, the analyst i is an all-star analyst (allstar) if i ranks in the top three of all the analysts covering 
stock j’s industry according to the most recent New Fortune Chinese Best Analysts survey. I compare the difference of average recommendations and average relative 
recommendations between analysts from foreign security firms and those from domestic security firms, as well as between all-star analysts and ordinary analysts. I use 
standard two-tail t-tests to test the statistical significance of the differences. “***” stands for the 1% significance level.   
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Table 6 Univariate analysis on analyst ratings and institutional and political pressure 
 
Panel 6A Analyst ratings and portfolio weight terciles of their mutual fund clients 
Portfolio weight terciles Rating codes All time periods  
Bull market 
period  
Bear market 
period  
Independent reports 
Portfolio weight = 0 
No. of Obs.= 11,572 
5: Strong buy 21.40% 17.32% 33.45% 
4: Buy 43.37% 41.73% 46.02% 
1-3: Hold or worse 35.23% 40.95% 20.53% 
Average ratings 3.79 3.70 3.93 
Avg(rec.-consensus) -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 
1st tercile 
Low portfolio weight 
Median= 0.43% 
 
5: Strong buy 24.52% 19.78% 35.59% 
4: Buy 51.70% 49.45% 47.28% 
1-3: Hold or worse 23.77% 30.77% 17.14% 
Average ratings 3.98*** 3.86*** 4.09*** 
Avg(rec.-consensus) -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.05* 
2nd tercile 
Mid portfolio weight 
Median= 0.81% 
  
5: Strong buy 40.73% 38.34% 35.67% 
4: Buy 45.76% 44.72% 47.29% 
1-3: Hold or worse 13.51% 16.94% 17.04% 
Average ratings 4.25*** 4.19*** 4.30*** 
Avg(rec.-consensus) 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.02*** 
3rd tercile 
High portfolio weight 
Median= 1.49% 
 
5: Strong buy 44.10% 38.08% 35.72% 
4: Buy 42.06% 44.42% 47.21% 
1-3: Hold or worse 13.84% 17.50% 17.08% 
Average ratings 4.27*** 4.17*** 4.37*** 
Avg(rec.-consensus) 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
Overall related reports 
Median= 0.81% 
No. of Obs.= 7,218                    
                                
5: Strong buy 36.45% 32.01% 35.53% 
4: Buy 46.51% 46.21% 47.07% 
1-3: Hold or worse 17.04% 21.78% 17.40% 
Average ratings 4.17*** 4.07*** 4.25*** 
Avg(rec.-consensus) 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 
 
Panel 6B Analyst ratings and state ownership terciles of covered stocks   
 
State ownership Rating codes All time periods  
Bull market 
period  
Bear market 
period  
Recommendations on 
stocks with no state 
ownership 
No. of Obs.=6,675 
5: Strong buy 26.80% 22.18% 29.86% 
4: Buy 45.35% 43.32% 44.74% 
1-3: Hold or worse 27.85% 34.50% 25.40% 
Average ratings 3.95 3.83 4.16 
Avg(rec.-consensus) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Non-political-connected  
recommendations on 
state-owned stocks 
No. of Obs.=6,741 
5: Strong buy 24.45% 20.10% 27.11% 
4: Buy 46.17% 45.34% 45.20% 
1-3: Hold or worse 29.39% 34.56% 27.69% 
Average ratings 3.87 3.77 3.97 
Avg(rec.-consensus) -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 
Politically connected 
recommendations on 
state-owned stocks  
No. of Obs.=5,098                                              
5: Strong buy 31.27% 24.08% 32.60% 
4: Buy 41.35% 41.11% 39.62% 
1-3: Hold or worse 27.38% 34.81% 27.78% 
Average ratings 4.01*** 3.86 4.14 
Avg(rec.-consensus) 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 
Portfolio weight is defined as the weight of stock j in all the mutual fund clients’ portfolios at quarter t-1. In Panel 
A, “***” (“*”) indicates that the mean value of absolute recommendation codes and relative recommendation 
codes issued by analysts who are subjected to pressure from their mutual fund clients are significantly different at 
or below the 1% (5%) significance level than the reports that are independent from mutual fund pressure according 
to two-tailed t-tests. In Panel B, “***” indicates that the mean value of absolute recommendation codes and 
relative recommendation codes issued by politically connected analysts on state-owned shares are significantly 
higher at or below the 1% significance level than their counterparts of non-political-connected analyst reports on 
state-owned shares according to two-tailed t-tests. The bull market period lasts from June 6th, 2005 to October 16th, 
2007. The rest of my sample period are bear market periods. 
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Table7 Mutual fund client and political pressure on analysts’ relative recommendations 
 Analyst recommendations relative to market consensus 
 Panel regression with fixed effects Ordered probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mutual fund pressure        
Related holdingt-1 0.042 0.054 0.023 0.034 0.023 0.033 0.054 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** 
Commission t-1   0.230 0.241 0.230 0.239 0.704 
   [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Political pressure        
Ceo_political×Stateown     0.059 0.092 0.112 
     [0.046]** [0.000]*** [0.025]** 
Firm Characteristics        
State own t-1  -0.013 -0.006 -0.013 -0.006 -0.039 -0.046 -0.092 
 [0.489] [0.731] [0.461] [0.750] [0.080]* [0.031]** [0.034]** 
Other fund own t-1 -0.063 -0.053 -0.056 -0.047 -0.056 -0.045 -0.128 
 [0.032]** [0.078]* [0.054]* [0.119] [0.054]* [0.134] [0.053]* 
Oversea list dummy 0.024 0.008 0.030 0.013 0.030 0.013 0.036 
 [0.074]* [0.561] [0.027]** [0.339] [0.029]** [0.347] [0.250] 
ROA t-1                                     0.041 0.015 0.047 0.266 0.051 0.041 -0.181 
 [0.714] [0.895] [0.675] [0.815] [0.650] [0.716] [0.429] 
Q t-1                                   0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 
 [0.615] [0.728] [0.381] [0.347] [0.386] [0.350] [0.123] 
Revenue t-1  -0.016 -0.009 -0.018 -0.012 -0.018 -0.011 0.023 
 [0.544] [0.708] [0.495] [0.624] [0.501] [0.653] [0.684] 
Firm size t-1            0.004 0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.034 
 [0.446] [0.868] [0.196] [0.070]* [0.214] [0.089]* [0.001]*** 
Div yield t-1 -0.142 -0.134 -0.133 -0.138 -0.132 -0.134 -0.061 
 [0.537] [0.578] [0.561] [0.564] [0.564] [0.575] [0.875] 
Broker Characteristics        
Foreign broker dummy -0.602 -0.600 -0.581 -0.581 -0.572 -0.565 -0.720 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Broker experience 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.019 0.013 0.018 0.019 
 [0.182] [0.001]*** [0.162] [0.001]*** [0.206] [0.003]*** [0.104] 
Analyst Characteristics        
All star dummy  0.023 0.105 0.022 0.107 0.022 0.107 0.185 
 [0.303] [0.000]*** [0.304] [0.000]*** [0.303] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Productivity 0.011 -0.037 0.010 -0.042 0.014 -0.043 -0.149 
 [0.884] [0.501] [0.890] [0.447] [0.856] [0.435] [0.151] 
Industry coverage -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
 [0.394] [0.095]* [0.334] [0.070]* [0.323] [0.074]* [0.284] 
Seniority 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 [0.171] [0.577] [0.058]* [0.848] [0.066]* [0.741] [0.522] 
Investment bank 
pressure 
       
I-bank relation dummy 0.073 0.090 0.070 0.087 0.070 0.086 0.156 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
Other controls        
Coverage no 0.006 0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.006 
 [0.370] [0.997] [0.468] [0.947] [0.481] [0.894] [0.719] 
Log quarter index -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 0.051 -0.012 -0.015 
 [0.109] [0.107] [0.058]* [0.083]* [0.650] [0.089]* [0.258] 
Random analyst effects Yes  Yes  Yes   
Random firm effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Wald Chi-squared 350.63 785.39 312.44 391.20 396.50 843.42 404.85 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.048 0.044 0.047 0.048 0.051 0.015    
 
 
Analysis time is 18 quarters, with the first quarter of 2004 representing time 0. Random effects 
GLS are panel regressions in which the random errors are decomposed into a cross-section, 
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illustrating stock analyst level (column 1, column 3 and column 5) or firm level heterogeneity 
(column 2, column 4 and column 6), and a time series component. The dependent variable is 
relative recommendations, defined as recommendations minus the quarterly market consensus. 
The definitions of independent variables are provided in Table 3. The ordered probit with robust 
standard errors in the last column models the three-level choice facing with a typical analyst: 
issuing an above, at, or below consensus recommendation. P values are in parenthesis. *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% percent levels, respectively. The number 
of observations in all models is 15,677. This is 3,113 less than the available number of 
firm-analyst quarters, because of missing observations on firm characteristic variables.  
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Table 8 Endogenous coverage selection 
Variables Recommendation relative to market consensus 
 Large firms only Heckman selection model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   1st step 2nd step 1st step 2nd step  
Mutual fund pressure       
Related holdingt-1 0.032 0.038 0.312 0.050 0.300 0.033 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commission t-1 0.183 0.200   0.243 0.164 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]***   [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Political pressure       
Ceo_political×Stateown 0.111 0.136 0.097 0.061 0.098 0.061 
 [0.009]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.009]*** [0.004]*** [0.008]*** 
Firm Characteristics       
State own t-1  -0.074 -0.072 1.305 0.027 1.305 0.023 
 [0.025]** [0.024]** [0.000]*** [0.203] [0.000]*** [0.274] 
Other fund own t-1 -0.077 -0.055 -0.099 -0.003 -0.099 -0.002 
 [0.087]* [0.238] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.015]** 
Oversea list dummy 0.022 0.010 0.629 -0.003 0.622 0.005 
 [0.191] [0.577] [0.000]*** [0.818] [0.000]*** [0.685] 
ROA t-1                                     0.301 0.253 4.313 0.113 4.312 0.105 
 [0.109] [0.180] [0.000]*** [0.299] [0.000]*** [0.332] 
Q t-1                                   -0.003 -0.005 0.141 0.002 0.140 -0.001 
 [0.599] [0.343] [0.000]*** [0.512] [0.000]*** [0.610] 
Revenue t-1  -0.024 -0.020 0.532 0.010 0.535 0.007 
 [0.584] [0.630] [0.000]*** [0.677] [0.000]*** [0.770] 
Firm size t-1            -0.004 -0.008 0.388 0.001 0.381 -0.007 
 [0.618] [0.323] [0.000]*** [0.713] [0.000]*** [0.085]* 
Div yield t-1 -0.410 -0.430 -0.926 -0.096 -0.921 -0.095 
 [0.235] [0.225] [0.000]*** [0.674] [0.000]*** [0.677] 
Broker Characteristics       
Foreign broker dummy -0.599 -0.587 -0.618 -0.541 -0.608 -0.522 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Broker experience 0.031 0.034 -0.053 0.017 -0.053 0.017 
 [0.020]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** 
Analyst Characteristics       
All star dummy 0.044 0.118  0.104  0.104 
 [0.154] [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Productivity 0.030 -0.032  -0.073  -0.085 
 [0.777] [0.694]  [0.160]  [0.104] 
Industry coverage -0.006 -0.007  -0.003  -0.003 
 [0.352] [0.102]  [0.314]  [0.328] 
Seniority 0.001 -0.001  -0.000  -0.000 
 [0.516] [0.193]  [0.234]  [0.351] 
I- bank pressure       
I-bank relation dummy 0.045 0.065 0.212 0.113 0.210 0.111 
 [0.216] [0.083]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Other controls       
Coverage no 0.001 0.002 0.451 0.008 0.450 0.005 
 [0.905] [0.853] [0.000]*** [0.234] [0.000]*** [0.502] 
Log quarter index -0.298 -0.026 0.339 -0.003  -0.005 
 [0.007]*** [0.021]** [0.000]*** [0.638]  [0.444] 
Instruments        
Broker industry cover   0.440  0.441  
   [0.000]***  [0.000]***  
Broker region cover   1.361  1.358  
   [0.000]***  [0.000]***  
Random analyst effects Yes      
Random firm effects  Yes     
Mill’s lambda    0.038  0.025 
    [0.002]***  [0.043]** 
Wald Chi-squared 282.56 528.32  41818.55  41840.57 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.064     
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Analysis time is 18 quarters, with the first quarter of 2004 representing time 0. The models in the 
first two columns replicate column 3 and column 4 in table 7 using the subsample for large firms 
only. Large firms are defined as the firms with sizes higher than the median firm size in each 
CSRC industry classification, ranked quarterly by total asset value. The last fmy columns use the 
full sample and are estimated as two-step Heckman selection models. The number of censored and 
uncensored observations is 499,052 and 15,677, respectively. Column 3 and column 5 are the first 
step, while column 4 and column 6 present the second step. I also report the Mill’s lambda and its 
significance levels. The dependent variable is relative recommendations, defined as 
recommendations minus the quarterly market consensus. The definitions of independent variables 
and instruments are provided in Table 3. P values are in parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 9 The composition of mutual fund clients and analysts’ relative recommendation 
 
Variables Recommendation relative to market consensus 
 Panel regression with random effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutual fund pressure       
Large related holdingt-1 2.399 2.699 1.514 1.719 1.512 1.713 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
Small related holdingt-1 0.425 0.619 -0.131 0.033 -0.127 0.004 
 [0.188] [0.064]* [0.698] [0.925] [0.706] [0.991] 
Commission t-1   0.218 0.233 0.217 0.231 
   [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Political pressure       
Ceo_political×Stateown     0.059 0.094 
     [0.045]** [0.000]*** 
Firm Characteristics       
State own t-1  -0.014 -0.006 -0.015 -0.007 -0.040 -0.047 
 [0.454] [0.740] [0.417] [0.716] [0.069]* [0.026]** 
Other fund own t-1 -0.056 -0.046 -0.054 -0.045 -0.054 -0.143 
 [0.055]* [0.127] [0.065]* [0.136] [0.066]* [0.153] 
Oversea list dummy 0.026 0.009 0.029 0.012 0.030 0.012 
 [0.059]* [0.528] [0.030]** [0.376] [0.032]** [0.385] 
ROA t-1                                     0.046 0.024 0.054 0.037 0.058 0.052 
 [0.686] [0.832] [0.629] [0.746] [0.605] [0.649] 
Q t-1                                   -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.961] [0.895] [0.320] [0.305] [0.324] [0.308] 
Revenue t-1  -0.016 -0.010 -0.017 -0.011 -0.016 -0.010 
 [0.531] [0.680] [0.524] [0.653] [0.530] [0.685] 
Firm size t-1            0.002 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 
 [0.729] [0.918] [0.239] [0.103] [0.258] [0.129] 
Div yield t-1 -0.153 -0.144 -0.142 -0.146 -0.142 -0.142 
 [0.504] [0.548] [0.534] [0.543] [0.536] [0.554] 
Broker Characteristics       
Foreign broker dummy -0.603 -0.605 -0.586 -0.588 -0.578 -0.573 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Broker experience 0.014 0.020 0.014 0.020 0.013 0.018 
 [0.170] [0.001]*** [0.149] [0.001]*** [0.192] [0.002]*** 
Analyst Characteristics       
All star dummy 0.021 0.105 0.022 0.107 0.022 0.107 
 [0.318] [0.000]*** [0.302] [0.000]*** [0.301] [0.000]*** 
Productivity 0.013 -0.033 0.008 -0.045 0.011 -0.046 
 [0.867] [0.547] [0.919] [0.414] [0.884] [0.400] 
Industry coverage -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 [0.362] [0.084]* [0.324] [0.067]* [0.314] [0.070]* 
Seniority 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 [0.149] [0.600] [0.055]* [0.883] [0.063]* [0.774] 
I- bank pressure       
I-bank relation dummy 0.072 0.088 0.069 0.086 0.069 0.086 
 [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.000]*** 
Other controls       
Coverage no 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 
 [0.477] 0.884 [0.491] [0.926] [0.505] [0.874] 
Log quarter index -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.132 -0.012 
 [0.108] [0.117] [0.059]* [0.083]* [0.059]* [0.089]* 
Random analyst effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Random firm effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald Chi-squared 363.65 791.33 394.50 825.60 399.89 841.13 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.048 0.047 0.050 0.048 0.051 
Large related holding is defined as the 20% largest mutual funds in terms of total equity value 
under management in the previous year. Small related holding is the non-large mutual funds. The 
dependent variable is analyst recommendation relative to market consensus. The definitions of the 
independent variables are provided in Table 3. The estimation models are identical to those in 
Table 7. P-values are in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 Change in the portfolio weight of a covered stock and analyst optimism 
 
Variables Active change in portfolio weight 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative recommendation dummyt -0.002 -0.003   
 [0.062]* [0.037]**   
All star relative recommendation 
dummyt 
-0.001 -0.002   
 [0.788] [0.601]   
Relative recommendation 
dummyt-1 
  -0.003 -0.004 
   [0.049]** [0.030]** 
All star relative recommendation 
dummyt-1 
  0.005 0.004 
   [0.158] [0.232] 
Change in ROAt 0.070 0.069 0.070 0.069 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Change in Revenuet 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** 
Change in firm sizet 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Change in Qt 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Change in dividend yieldt 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Change in stock pricet 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Change in stock indext  0.020 0.019 0.020 0.020 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Change in holdings by other 
mutual fundst 
0.040 0.039 0.040 0.039 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Change in the no. of other mutual 
fundst 
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Random broker effects Yes  Yes  
Random firm effects  Yes  Yes 
Wald Chi-squared 3734.81 3740.08 3733.95 3737.61 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
 
The dependent variable is the change in the weight of a covered stock in mutual fund clients’ portfolios. 
The change is measured from the end of quarter t to the end of quarter t-1. Random effects GLS are panel 
regressions in which the random errors are decomposed into a cross-section, illustrating stock broker 
(brokerage firm) level (column 1 and column 3) or firm level heterogeneity (column 2 and column 4), and 
a time series component. The independent variables are measured as the change of the respective firm 
characteristic between quarter t and quarter t-1. Relative recommendation dummy is equal to one if at least 
one business-related analyst issues a more optimistic recommendation (relative to market consensus) on 
the stock held by the mutual fund clients, zero otherwise. All-star relative recommendation dummy is equal 
to one if at least one business-related all-star analyst issues a more optimistic recommendation (relative to 
market consensus) on the stock held by the mutual fund clients, zero otherwise. I use both 
contemporaneous relative recommendations and one quarter lagged relative recommendations. P-values 
are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.   
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      Table 11 Bull and Bear market analysis on analyst behavior 
 
Variables Recommendation relative to market consensus 
 Bear Market Bull Market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mutual fund pressure     
Related holding t-1 0.023 0.034 0.022 0.030 
 [0.066]* [0.010]*** [0.027]** [0.004]*** 
Commission t-1 0.173 0.176 0.296 0.330 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
     
Political pressure     
Ceo_political×Stateown 0.073 0.155 0.009 0.026 
 [0.100]* [0.000]*** [0.821] [0.444] 
     
Firm Characteristics     
State own t-1  -0.051 -0.053 -0.026 -0.034 
 [0.143] [0.115] [0.369] [0.224] 
Other fund own t-1 -0.021 -0.018 -0.073 -0.069 
 [0.612] [0.681] [0.070]* [0.094]* 
Oversea list dummy 0.030 0.012 0.021 0.015 
 [0.101] [0.540] [0.281] [0.435] 
ROA t-1                                     0.283 0.250 -0.193 -0.180 
 [0.075]* [0.129] [0.231] [0.263] 
Q t-1                                   -0.009 -0.007 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.022]** [0.083]* [0.973] [0.926] 
Revenue t-1  -0.034 -0.014 0.004 0.008 
 [0.324] [0.679] [0.927] [0.832] 
Firm size t-1            -0.013 -0.014 0.001 0.005 
 [0.099]* [0.065]* [0.933] [0.503] 
Div yield t-1 0.387 0.052 -0.284 -0.174 
 [0.468] [0.927] [0.267] [0.510] 
Broker Characteristics     
Foreign broker dummy -0.574 -0.500 -0.581 -0.593 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Broker experience 0.004 -0.003 0.025 0.035 
 [0.783] [0.773] [0.030]** [0.000]*** 
Analyst Characteristics     
All star dummy  0.061 0.102 0.064 0.108 
 [0.085]* [0.000]*** [0.015]** [0.000]*** 
Productivity 0.040 -0.168 0.079 0.034 
 [0.733] [0.041]** [0.424] [0.649] 
Industry coverage -0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 
 [0.942] [0.561] [0.369] [0.044]** 
Seniority 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 [0.096]* [0.099]* [0.134] [0.007]*** 
Investment bank pressure     
I-bank relation dummy 0.050 0.083 0.070 0.086 
 [0.103] [0.011]** [0.032]** [0.010]*** 
Other controls     
Coverage no 0.008 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.379] [0.814] [0.940] [0.908] 
Log quarter index -0.013 -0.018 -0.004 -0.005 
 [0.182] [0.070]* [0.673] [0.599] 
Random analyst Effects Yes  Yes  
Random firm Effects  Yes  Yes 
Wald Chi-squared 161.02 319.70 303.54 570.12 
Prob>Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.043 0.062 0.063 
 
I split my sample into bear market period (column 1 and column 2) and bull market period (column 3 
and column 4) and replicate my analysis in Table 7. The bull market period lasts from June 6th, 2005 to 
October 16th, 2007. The rest of my sample period are bear market periods.P values are in parenthesis. *, ** and 
*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
  
Table 12 Investment returns from following analyst recommendations  
 
Table 12A Mean 3-day abnormal return around the recommendation date 
 Overall Fund-relate
d 
Independent Difference 
All recommendations 0.49% 0.28% 0.62% 0.34% 
    [0.000]*** 
More optimistic than market 
consensus 
0.70% 0.57% 0.84% 0.27% 
    [0.050]** 
Less optimistic than market consensus 0.12%+ 0.04%+ 0.17% 0.13% 
    [0.206] 
Strong buy 1.02% 0.61% 1.44% 0.84% 
    [0.000]*** 
Buy 0.52% 0.24% 0.71% 0.47% 
    [0.000]*** 
Hold or worse -0.01%+ -0.34% -0.00%+ 0.34% 
    [0.046]** 
 
I use the standard market model to compute the abnormal returns. The estimation period is from 
day -126 to day -7 before the analyst recommendation and the market index is the equally 
weighted returns on all stocks on the Shanghai or Shenzhen index (stock j is listed on either the 
Shanghai or the Shenzhen stock exchange). Day 0 marks the recommendation date. The three-day 
abnormal returns are statistically larger than 0 at the 1% significance level except for those with a 
“+”superscript. Difference is defined as the average daily abnormal return associated with 
fund-unrelated (independent) recommendations minus the fund-related recommendations. P values 
for two tailed statistics are presented in parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
 
Table 12B Daily returns from a buy-and-hold strategy that acts on analyst 
recommendations 
   Overall Fund related 
recommendations 
(a) 
Independent 
recommendations 
(b) 
Difference 
(a)- (b) 
More optimistic 
than market 
consensus 
(1) Raw return 0.025% -0.045% 0.029% -0.074% 
(2) Mkt-adj. 
return 
-0.048% -0.181%** -0.064% -0.117% 
(3) Market 
model 
-0.000% -0.060% 0.053% -0.114% 
Equal or less 
optimistic than 
market consensus 
(4) Raw return 0.105% 0.171% 0.083% 0.088% 
(5) Mkt-adj. 
return 
0.005% 0.044% -0.021% 0.065% 
(6) Market 
model 
0.000% 0.047% -0.041% 0.088% 
 
This table reports the average daily raw buy-and-hold returns, average daily market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold returns and average daily abnormal returns from acting on the analyst recommendations. 
 60 
Each recommendation is assumed to stop influencing investment behavior after 250 trading day after its 
report date unless a downgrade to “under perform” or “sell” is issued by the same analyst on the same 
stock for a “strong buy” or “buy” recommendation within 250 trading days, or an upgrade to “buy” or 
“strong buy” is issued by the same analyst on the same stock for an “under perform” or “sell” 
recommendation within the 250 trading days. I use a two-tailed t-test to examine whether 
market-adjusted returns and market model returns are statistically different from 0. In addition, I use a 
two-tailed t-test to examine whether the market-adjusted return and return from the market model are 
statistically different across fund-related analyst reports and independent analyst reports. *, ** and *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively.  
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